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INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY
Law andthe PoliticalEconomy ofthe
World∗
DAVID KENNEDY∗∗
Abstract
The interpenetration of global political and economic life has placed questions of ‘political
economy’ on the scholarly agenda across the social sciences. The author argues that inter-
national law could contribute to understanding and transforming centre–periphery patterns
of dynamic inequality in global political economic life. The core elements of both economic
andpoliticalactivity–capital,labour,credit,andmoney,aswellaspublicorprivatepowerand
right–arelegalinstitutions.Lawisthelinkbindingcentresandperipheriestooneanotherand
structuringtheirinteraction.Itisalsothevernacularthroughwhichpowerandwealthjustify
theirexerciseandshroudtheirauthority.Theauthorproposesrethinkinginternationallawas
aterrainforpoliticalandeconomicstruggleratherthanasanormativeortechnicalsubstitute
forpolitical choice, itselfindifferent tonaturalﬂows ofeconomic activity.
Key words
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1. INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING THE BIG PICTURE: GLOBAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY
The visible interpenetration of global political and economic life has changed the
contextforinternationalscholarlyinquiry.Thecentralquestionstodayarenotpolit-
icalquestions–ifbythatwemeanquestionstobeaddressedbygovernmentsacting
alone or negotiated through conventional diplomatic circuits. They are not eco-
nomicquestions–ifbythatwemeanquestionstobeansweredbytheoperationsof
markets,guidedbythehandofrobustcompetitionintheshadowofregulation.Nor
are they questions aboutthe appropriaterelationshipbetween politics and econom-
ics, such as how public power might harness the economy through regulation, or
how economicactivitymightbest besupportedby and freedfromthepublichand.
∗ This essay summarizes and extends a series of studies I have undertaken in the ﬁelds of international law,
international economic law, comparative law, European law, the law of war, and the law of economic
developmentwhichcan befoundonmywebsiteat www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/dkennedy/publications.I
cite here only works developing examples which I highlight here and which were not cited in those prior
studies.VersionsofthisessayweredeliveredattheAmericanUniversityofCairo,19February2012;atKing’s
CollegeLondon, 19April 2012; and at SciencesPo Law School,Paris, 11 May2012.
∗∗ DavidKennedyisManleyO.HudsonProfessorofLawandDirectoroftheInstituteforGlobalLawandPolicy
at HarvardLaw School.http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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Thedistributionofgrowthhasdisplacedideologicalhegemonyandgreat-power
competition as the framework for global political struggle. The global distribution
of opportunities to generate and retain rents from economic activity has replaced
thequestionwhetherprivatecompetitionwillbeliberatedfromordefeatedbyinter-
state competition in the global economy. How gains and losses will be distributed
between those who lead and those who lag and how the struggle between winners
and losers will be carried out are questions best addressed by thinking of politics
and economics as intertwined projects and close collaborators in the distribution
of political authority and economic reward. The answer to these classic questions
of politicaleconomywill be a functionof the interactions amongpeople across the
world with diverse powers and vulnerabilities arising from diverse political and
economic arrangements. Understanding these dynamics requires analysis of the
iterative micro- and macro-processes through which conﬂict takes place, whether
we thinkofthatconﬂict initiallyas‘economic competition’or ‘politicalstruggle’.
The intellectual foundations for the return of political economy to academic
life have been laid. The demand to understand questions of political economy has
challenged the most robust analytic models in economics and political science to
endogenize social, cultural, and institutional factors. Economists are reaching out
to understand the institutional, social, psychological, and political arrangements
which undergird global economic life. Scholars in sociology, political science, and
international relations have renewed their interest in the impact of international
economicarrangementsonlocal,national,andglobalpolitics.Heterogeneoustrad-
itions in social-theory, economic, and legal scholarship have opened a window on
the politics embedded in the basic operations of economic life; the interrelated
nature of political and economic life in a world of global markets and local govern-
ment; the mechanisms by which inequalities between leading and lagging sectors,
nations, and regions are reproduced; and the modes through which ‘governance’,
whetherlocal,national,orglobal,alltoooftenoperatesasanunsatisfyingcoverfor
economic dominance and political dysfunction. Heterogeneous traditions in law
have uncovered the institutional roots of the global economy and polity in local
and private rules with transnational effect, in informal networks and professional
practice, and in the dispersed regulatory and administrative regimes of many na-
tions and localities. They have identiﬁed the glue which binds the global economy
togetherandtheinstitutionalformsandpracticeswhichfragment,professionalize,
and disempowerourpolitics.
Itisnowclearthattheelementsofeconomiclife–capital,labour,credit,money,
liquidity–arecreaturesoflaw.Thesamecanbesaidfortheelementsofpoliticallife–
power and right. Law not only regulates these things, it creates them. The history
of political and economic life is therefore also a history of institutions and laws.
Law constitutes the actors, places them in structures, and helps set the terms for
their interaction. It often provides the language – and the stakes – for economic
and political struggle. As a result, legal arrangements offer a privileged window
onto political economic dynamics. Academic inquiry ought to be able to trace the
micro-andmacro-processesthroughwhichpeoplestruggleovereconomicbeneﬁts
andpoliticalauthorityintheirlegalentitlementsandvulnerabilities.Legalanalysishttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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of this type could illuminate the large-scale political economic changes that are
upending our world and their roots in the quotidian exercise of entitlements and
capabilitiesinthe capillariesofsociety.
With understanding may come proposals for reform. Economies conﬁgured dif-
ferently will operate differently, just as different allocations of legal capacities and
authoritywillgeneratedivergentpolities.Bytracingtheimpactoflegalformsonthe
economicandpoliticalactorsandactivitiestheyconstitute,scholarsshouldbeable
toidentifychoicesamongdifferentpoliticalandeconomictrajectories.Itshouldbe
possible to identify alternative, even equally efﬁcient or democratic, modes of eco-
nomicandpoliticallifewithdivergingpatternsofinequality,alternatedistributions
of political power and economic beneﬁt, more or less space for experimentation or
contestation.
Nevertheless, surprisingly little scholarship in the international legal ﬁeld aims
to illuminate the global distribution of political authority and economic growth. It
ishardtosayexactlywhy.Muchlegalscholarshipremainsparochial,enthralledby
thedetailsofeachnationallegalsystem’stotemicinstitutions.Takentogether,these
institutionsalsostructuretheworld’spoliticaleconomicorder,butitisraretotrace
their impact on the micro-dynamics of global economic and political interactions,
let alone propose their transformation in the name of an alternate global political
economicvision.Thelegitimationofexistinginstitutionalarrangementsisrepeated
at the international level, where central banks, the European Union, the WTO –
even the United Nations – have become objects of a cult-like veneration among
the academics who study their operation, no less than the modern corporate form
or the various institutions facilitating investment. They simply must be honoured,
appeased, and defended. This academic tendency has parallels in popular wisdom.
In the United States, for example, an enormous majority can view the government
as a dysfunctional part of the problem without anyone seriously proposing to alter
anythingaboutit.The governmentis crazy–the Constitutionis sacred.
At the same time, the technical professional conventions governing scholarly
production in the legal ﬁeld discourage pronouncements about the large trends in
global political and economic life. The trending legal scholarship is small-bore pre-
cision analytics, reﬁning and refurbishing the existing lexicons of policy, doctrine,
and theory. In my view, scholars should not shy away from developing macro-scale
picturesofglobalpoliticaleconomy,ifonlybecausethinkingaboutmoretechnical
matters often rests on broad convictions about the nature of the world which no
longer hold. Take the distinction between ‘advanced’ and ‘developing’ economies.
Many routine ideas about institutional forms and regulatory arrangements rest on
an idea about the ‘kind’ of society people are talking about – one which is at the
cuttingedgeofhistory,whereeconomicandpoliticalarrangementsare‘mature’and
most things work, or one which still has ‘a long way to go’ and is plagued by anom-
alies.Werethisframetochange,muchwouldneedtoberethought.Andyetitwould
be more accurate today to start from the premise that all economies, including the
world economy,aredevelopingeconomies.
In this, a fundamental neo-liberal insight was correct: just as the ideological
fault line between the First and Second Worlds no longer deﬁnes global politicalhttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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struggle, the economic fault line between an ‘underdeveloped’ Third World and a
‘modern industrialized’ First World no longer deﬁnes global economic relations.
Not, however, because liberal democratic politics has become the global default
or because the management of routine business cycles in deregulated markets has
becometheuniversalnationaleconomicchallenge.Quitethecontrary.Thediversity
of political arrangements has increased. All countries have political characteristics
once routinely thought anomalous and there is no one ‘normal’ or mature form
for political life. Stable and signiﬁcant political regimes come in many varieties –
more or less authoritarian, more or less religious, more or less decentralized, more
and less technocratic, with different blends of public and private economic power.
Few could be said to work well when it comes to addressing large-scale issues of
political economy and the distribution of growth. It is not simply that the state
has been ‘unbundled’ or political power ‘networked’ across boundaries. Politics has
everywhere become a diminished shadow of economics as political institutions
and elites have been instrumentalized by economic interests. It is not surprising
that they ﬁnd themselves deadlocked – or simply disengaged – when it comes to
addressing issues ‘inthe publicinterest’.
Atthesametime,theeconomicchallengescharacteristicofthe‘developingworld’
havebecomecommonacrosstheindustrializedworld.Alleconomiesfacestrategic
choicesbetweendifferentmodesofinsertionintheglobaleconomy;confrontchal-
lengesofinequalityandstructuraldualism;ﬁndtheireconomiesrivenwithmarket
failures, information, and public-goods problems for which they lack instruments
torespond;andﬁndthemselvestalkingaboutnewstrategiesforgrowthratherthan
the efﬁcient management of a relatively stable business cycle. In short, the differ-
ence between the First and Third Worlds has eroded because all nations now face
political,social,and economic challenges once typicaloftheThird World.
A portrait of the political economy of the contemporary world might begin
with the observation that across the world, political authority is weaker and more
dispersed,economicﬂowsmorevaried.Thefragmentationanddispersionofpolitical
authorityhasrenderedeconomiclifevulnerabletopoliticalrisksfromunanticipated
quarters while the forces unleashed by the globalization of economic life batter
political elites from everywhere and nowhere at once. This has transformed the
arrangementofcentres,peripheriesandsemi-peripheriesfromtheageofcolonialism
ortheColdWar.Focusonthe‘riseofAsia’ortheemergenceofa‘multi-polar’world
can make it seem that structural inequality has fallen with the demise of a world
systemofcentreandperiphery.Nothingcouldbefurtherfromthetruth.Economic
andpoliticalbargainingpowerremainsunevenlydistributed–butnotalongasingle
axis.
The dispersion of political and economic forces has ignited a rapid global pro-
cess of factor price equalization and technological assimilation among what once
seemed the centre and the periphery of the world system. It turns out the last two
centuries were an aberration as one nation and then a small group of nations rose
tounprecedentedlevelsofrelativeprosperityandpoliticalinﬂuenceinthewakeof
the Industrial Revolution. The relative hegemony of a North Atlantic political and
economiccentrewasreinforcedforalongtimebyeverythingfrommilitarypowertohttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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thestructureofthenovel,frommultinationalindustrialmonopoliestoHollywood
movies.Thishegemonyhasabruptlyerodedasthescientiﬁctechnologies,manage-
mentinstitutionsandgovernancearrangementswhichenabledthedramaticriseof
the North Atlantic have become widespread and people everywhere have become
abletoaspiretoarefrigerator,anairconditioner,acar,andthegovernmentnecessary
to realizethose ambitions.
But economic and political change on this scale is profoundly destructive and
relative income equalization is an extremely uneven business. It certainly does not
mean the elimination of income differentials. On the contrary, inequality is every-
where.Aglobaleconomyisnotauniformeconomy.Thingsturnatdifferentspeeds.
People are left out. People are dragged down. When people turn to their sovereigns
forhelp,theresultsareterriblyuneven.Somearetoobigtofail–otherstoosmallto
count.Indeed,thepublichandeverywherehasbecomeaforcemultiplierforleading
sectors, nations, regions – as it was between nations in the colonial era. As growth
here erodes incomes there and consolidates itself as political right, a proliferation
ofcentre–peripherydynamicsbecomevisible.Asaresult,globalpoliticaleconomy
today rests on an accelerating social and economic dualism between leading and
lagging sectors, economies, nations and populations. It is not surprising that we
face a revolution of rising frustrations among the hundreds of millions who can
see in, but for whom there seems no route through the screen except rebellion and
spectacle. Or that we face the restive demoralization of all those whose incomes,
economic opportunities, and expectations have fallen – and will likely continue to
fall.
The political responses everywhere aim to protect and promote winners, some-
times with a vague promise of transfer payments to compensate losers. But the
politicalchallengeisnottoﬁndresourcestopouronthewinnersinthehopesthey
willrenderour‘nation’competitive.Nationsarenolongercompeting–andwinners
can usually take care of themselves. In a global economy, it is simply not plausible
foreveryonetobeahighest-tech,greenest,innovation-drivenknowledgeeconomy,
any more than everyone can be the lowest-wage manufacturer. These are niche
market dreams that function as justiﬁcations for mobilizing resources behind the
successful. They serve to defer rather than underwrite the promise to compensate.
Thewildhorsetoberiddennowisthedynamicofdualismbetweensectors,regions,
industries–andnations.Thepoliticalandeconomicobjectiveoughttobeproduct-
ively linking those who lead with those who lag in reciprocal and virtuous cycles,
ratherthanencouraginggrowthheretoimpoverishthereinthehopesthatoneday
the losers maybe madewhole.
In this essay, I encourage legal scholars to improve their ability to speak about
the role of law in this kind of large-scale reordering of political and economic
life. I start with the intuition that law has played a central role in two grand,
mutually supportive projects which have brought global political economy to this
unfortunate point. In the second section, I sketch these two projects. On the one
hand,economicshaseverywherebeendisentangledfrompoliticsandeconomiclife
disembeddedfrompoliticalcontestation.Ontheother,botheconomicsandpolitics
have been technically consolidated whether within or across national boundaries.http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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Both projects have reﬂected the broad ideological commitments of the policy class
andbothwerecarriedoutaslegalandinstitutionalundertakings,supportedbythe
knowledge practices of dedicated professionals. Together they have generated the
conditions–theagentsandthestructures–foraworldpoliticaleconomymarkedby
an accelerating dualism between the regions, sectors, and classes to whom much –
and to whom little – has been given. My hope is that international legal scholars
willdeveloptheintellectualtools tohelpunderstand and unravelthese dynamics.
As a step in that direction, I propose that legal scholars revitalize two intellec-
tual traditions:the analysis of relationsbetween ‘centres’ and ‘peripheries’in socio-
economic systems and analysis of the role of law in the background distribution
of bargaining power within such systems. In the third section of this essay, I de-
scribehowtheseintellectualtraditionsmighthelpclarifythedistributionofpower
and economic opportunity in what otherwise might seem a diffuse jumble of insti-
tutional and regulatory structures framing the chaotic operations of political and
economiclifeafterglobalization.Myclaimisthatreﬂectionontheroleoflawinthe
dynamic relationship between centres and peripheries will focus attention on the
crucialquestionsofglobalpoliticaleconomy:thedynamicsofinequality;thedistri-
butionsofgrowth;thereproductionofhierarchieswithinandbetweenleadingand
lagging sectors, regions, nations, and cultures. Taken together, strands from these
intellectualtraditions–heterogeneous,institutionalist,realist,critical,sociological,
postmodernist, post-Marxist, progressive – offer tools for identifying the political
arrangements,discourses,institutions,anddebatesthatstructureordisruptthosedy-
namicsandforhighlightingtheroleofexpertiseinrenderingthemnormal,carrying
themout–orenablingtheircontestationandtransformation.Inthefourthsection,I
assessthepotentialforscholarlyworkintheinternational-lawﬁeldtodrawonthese
traditionstounderstandandhelptoremakethepoliticaleconomyofthe world.
2. THE GRAND POLITICAL ECONOMIC PROJECTS THAT BROUGHT US
HERE
2.1. Insulateeconomicactivityfrom politicalcontestation
The ﬁrst project – the separation of economic activity from political contestation –
has its roots in the effort to pursue economics and politics on different scales.
The economy has become global while political order remains lashed to local and
territorialgovernmentstructures.Theresultisarupturebetweenalocalandnational
politics on the one hand and a global economy and society on the other. It is the
relative mobility of economics and territorial rigidity of politics that has rendered
each unstable. Political and economic leadership have drifted apart. A spiral has
begun – as the winners lock in an ever weaker territorial politics and an ever more
dominant economic order. Political leadership has everywhere become peripheral
to economicmanagement.
Themachineryforaterritorialpoliticsandadeterritorializedeconomicsistech-
nical and legal. Economic activity can only happen on a global scale if the insti-
tutional arrangements are in place to support it, just as political activity can only
be concentrated territorially if the institutions responsible for political life havehttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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distinct jurisdictions. At a most primitive level, private rights, understood to lie
outside or before politics, travel easily – if you own something here, you own it
when you get off the plane somewhere else. Public policies, the stuff of politics, do
not travel, except as necessary to support the broader market. Political institutions
havethelegalauthoritytoenforceprivateagreementsandprivaterightsestablished
elsewhere.Buttheycannotregulatebeyondtheirborders.Althoughyourlabourlaw
may affect the economy of your neighbour, your writ does not run there. The tech-
nical distinction between exercises of public authority which support the market
and those which regulate or otherwise distort the marketis crucial – the one travels
moreeasilythantheother.Asthisdistinctionisinterpretedandimplementedacross
dozensofinstitutionalsettings,aprofessionalsensibilityorcommonsenseemerges
aboutthesubstantiveandterritoriallimitsofpublicpowerandaboutthescaleand
naturalness ofeconomic ﬂows.
Asapoliticalruleroperatingintheshadowofthisconsensusyouareaspectator
as the waves set in motion by your local actions ripple across the global economy.
Your interests, constituencies, and authority are deﬁned by a series of distinctions
managedandenforcedbytheongoingworkofvariousexpertvotarieswhointerpret
your mandate and explicate the force of legalized economic interests. As a result,
the global nature of ‘problems’ and the local nature of ‘government’, whether linked
to a city, a state, or the international order itself, is not only a troubling fact to
be overcome. It is the product of a very particular political economy written into
a historically speciﬁc set of legal and institutional arrangements. It generates, in
turn, modes of political and economic life which pull away from one another –
aself-conﬁdentandtechnicalformofglobaleconomicmanagementdetachedfrom
the locations or modes of production, and a media-centred form of political dis-
cussion disconnected from the technical management of government, pursued in
part as gladiatorial spectacle and in part as allegorical morality tale. Meanwhile,
in the background, government has become technical by division of competences,
authorities, and mandates, while economics has grown technical by consolidation
in evermorerapidlyinterlinked and speculativemarkets.
Theriftbetweeneconomicsandpoliticsisnotsimplytheresultofanideological
commitmenttotheirdistinctiveness–akindof‘neo-liberal’overreach.Populardis-
course has been full of voices for and against a ‘laissez-faire’ separation of politics
from economic life for more than a century. Although the professionals who build
and manage the political economy of today’s world sometimes argue in such hy-
perbolic terms, when it comes to the details where the rubber meets the road, their
differences are minor. At least privately, most easily acknowledge the interpene-
tration of politics and economics, the unavoidable need for economic regulation
and the importance of political leadership for sound economic policy. The roots
for the rift between local politics and global economics lie deeper in the dynamic
consequences of those everyday details and will require more to reverse than an
ideologicalconversion.
Noraretheprofessionalvernacularsthroughwhichthepoliticaleconomicorder
ismanagedbasedonasharpconceptualboundarybetweenpoliticsandeconomics.
Economics and politics are not powers absolute within delimited spheres, deﬁnedhttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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in a kind of global constitutional settlement and managed by the interpretation
of formal distinctions and boundaries. Although people sometimes imagine them
this way, just as it is common to imagine sharp distinctions between property
entitlements–yourland/myland–orpoliticaljurisdictionsandcompetences,this
is not accurate. Individual political and economic ‘rights’, even to property, rarely
work in this kind of on–off way. The relationship between you and me is all about
what each of us can do with our land that may affect the other, about the terms
of our relationship rather than the demarcation of our difference. When managed
by jurists or policy professionals, those terms are detailed matters of more or less,
determined bythebalancing ofcompetinginterests and objectives.
In the professional communities where economics and politics are carried out,
this is also widely understood. Just as experts know private right and public power
blend into one another in many ways, they also know that politics can be hard
to distinguish from economics in any categorical sense. The practical differences
betweenthemareproducedalmostasaby-productoftheroutineprofessionalmak-
ing–andunmaking–ofaninﬁniteseriesofsmall-scaletechnicaldistinctionswhich
can be experienced by the experts who interpret them as matters for subtle balan-
cingratherthansharpline-drawing:betweenpublicandprivate,nationalandinter-
national, family and market, between regulations which support the market and
thosewhichdistortmarketprices,orbetweenactsofthestatewhichenforceprivate
rights and those whichburdenthemwith regulation.
Such distinctions may not, in the end, be logically or philosophically satisfying,
but they often work as a practical matter, at least sufﬁciently that experts may ﬁnd
professionally satisfactory ways of distinguishing situations that seem to go ‘too
far’ in one or the other direction. As those who manage the institutions of political
economic life repeatedly ﬁnd ways to draw the line in speciﬁc situations, profes-
sional traditions emerge devoted to each domain. International private law experts
think differently than those focused on transnational regulation. The professions
responsible for the management of public and of private law, or of market making
and market regulating, have grown apart, coming to occupy different institutional
sites and to speak about the world in divergent vernaculars. Over time, the diver-
gentstylesoftechnicalinterpretationindifferentdisciplineshardenthedifferences
between domainsthatno one thinksdistinct.
The same can be said on a larger scale of the difference between economics and
politics.Insomesense,therelationshipbetweenpoliticsandeconomicsissimplya
matterofinterpretationandperspective.Thesmallestmarkettransaction–aT-shirt
sellsinGhana–canbeinterpretedtoilluminatethepoliticsortheeconomicsofthe
planet.Yetalternativedisciplinesandinstitutionalarrangementshavesprungupto
reﬂectdivergentinterpretationsofthissametransaction.Aspoliticsandeconomics
have become increasingly technical, they have come to be served by distinct pro-
fessions operating on different scales and with different perspectives. Economists
and politicians understand the scale and ‘logic’ of the transaction differently and
embed it in a different social, institutional, and intellectual context. Their differ-
ences emerge as different styles of analysis, different default interpretations, differ-
ent background assumptions. As they pursue their routine work, an intellectuallyhttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
LAW AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD 15
unsatisfying distinction develops into a startling mismatch between institutional,
intellectual, social, and professional domains. As a consequence, the fault line
between politics and economics cannot be undone by legal ﬁat any more than
by ideological reversal. The trick is to understand the rift between politics and eco-
nomicsasaprojectundertakeneverywhereatoncebyprofessionalsandexpertswho
aresimplydoingtheirjob,interpretingtheircompetences,pursuingtheirinterests.
Only by bending the arc of their routine work will the political economy of the
worldbe transformed.
2.2. Consolidateboth economics and politics as technicallyintegrated ﬁelds
for professional management
The second grand project – the technical integration and consolidation of both
economics and politics – has also been accomplished through a series of legal,
institutional, and professional projects. They have been undertaken in the shadow
of a loose consensus within the global policy class about the natural teleologies for
economic and political life. The economic idea is simple. Although it is common
to think of an ‘economy’ as something nations have – the German economy, the
Japaneseeconomy–atleastforthosewhoaspiretomanageitthroughpolicy,tothe
extentpeoplehavealsocometothinkofaneconomyasa‘market’,itisdifﬁcultnot
alsotothinkofaneconomyassomethingthatcanbescaledupordown.Andtothink
that scaling up is generally good. Ever more people, products, resources, and ideas
oughttobeabletoﬁndtheirmarketsintheshadowofacommonpricesystemacross
ever greater distances. As a result, when putting an economy together, it is a good
idea to try to link as many things together as efﬁciently as possible at the national,
regional,andgloballevels.Thishasalwaysbeenmoreideathanreality.Despitethe
prevalenceoflocalandsectoralspeciﬁcities,informalnetworks,oligopolies,barter,
intra-enterprise trade, market failures, bottlenecks, and other anomalies, it is part
of the background consciousness of ruling classes everywhere that, fundamentally,
theeconomyisnaturallybecominganevermoreundifferentiatedglobalmarketin
which ‘ﬂows’ ofgoodsand services followpricesto moreproductiveuses.
Thisideahashaddozensofpracticalandtechnicalcorollaries.Asystemof‘world
prices’ requires all kinds of institutional arrangements and limitations. Exchange
ratesmusteitherbestable–effectivelyasinglecurrency–orsoﬂuidastoensurethey
are pushed to parity by market forces. Supplychains, informationchannels, labour
markets, investment patterns ought all to be rendered global through institutional
andlegalintegration.Privateactors–investors,employees,managers,corporations–
need to understand themselves as capacitated to operate across an ever larger ter-
rain. To do so, they need to be legally disembedded from the kinds of local cus-
tomary or regulatory arrangements that once made employers feel they must hire
from among the members of a particular union, or corporations feel they must
respond to the public interest of speciﬁc locations or constituencies. Economic en-
titiesthemselvesneedtobereconstitutedandunbundled,renderedcapableofbeing
reorganized,reframed,parcelledoutforsaleandredeployment.Whereregulationor
contractimposeartiﬁcialobstaclestothevertiginousdestructionandcreativerein-
ventionofeconomicrelations,theyneedtobeunwound.Transnationalprivatelegalhttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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arrangementsandinformalstandardsneedtobeprotectedfromtheregulatoryinter-
ferenceoflocalpoliticalandjudicialauthorities.Territoriallyenforcedpublicpolicy
which distorts rather than supports market prices needs to be either eliminated or
harmonizedaspartofastablebackgroundforglobalmarkettransactions.Although
there is much media discussion of national economic policy, most of the work of
economic management in fact consists of small-scale projects to ﬁne-tune the in-
stitutional conditions for market efﬁciency on a far wider scale. These are carried
out by experts working in myriad settings: national and international, public and
private. So long as management is carried out in this common spirit, the locus of
discussion matters little. Over time, a kind of global common sense has emerged
about what governments and private actors are and do and global economic life on
a large scale has been consolidated in ways which set what have come to seem the
naturallimitsofterritorialgovernmentandpubliclawregulation.
On the political side, the dominant idea is also pretty simple. Politics is all about
a ‘polity’ – usually a community of people associated in some way with a territory.
As a result, politics does not scale the way markets do. Where economies scale
horizontally, politics can more easily be deepened and rendered responsive along a
vertical axis of representation and accountability. The vertical activity of rulership
has become the work of a profession linked to the institutional arrangements we
call government. Politics has come to mean the special domain of work performed
by government, itself a collection of specialized competences. As politics matures,
the work of these people becomes ever more horizontally divided along functional
lines:specialistsintransportpolicyandindustrialpolicyandhealthpolicy,aswellas
political consultants, media commentators, policy advocates, and the very speciﬁc
set ofpeoplewe call‘politicians’.
Good governance requires that these specialists strengthen the link between
policy and the public interest both by strengthening the horizontal speciﬁcation
of mandates or separation of powers and by intensifying the vertical mechanics
of rulership through accountability, transparency, citizen empowerment, and ruler
responsiveness. The perfection of the polity requires and produces a parallel trans-
formation of both rulers and ruled through one or another form of responsive
democracyandthe‘ruleoflaw’.Thisisalsomoreideathanreality,butitprovidesan
orientingframefortheworkofpoliticalspecialists.Theyshouldaimtoperfecttheir
specialtechnicalexpertiseorcompetenceandintensifytheirrepresentationallinks
to localconstituencies throughmechanisms ofaccountabilityand transparency.
Unsurprisingly,politicsbuiltintheshadowoftheseideasischaracterizedbyboth
technical consolidation and division: separating national territories into autono-
mous states, separating branches of government with different competences and
constituencies and separating different levels of government with degrees of relat-
ive autonomy. In each setting, political competence is about the management of
divided competences, specialized knowledge, and local constituencies. At different
moments, policy elites seem to become enthusiasts for a similar machinery of ‘re-
sponsiveness’acrossthespectrumofspecialcompetences,divergentconstituencies,
and levels of accountability. At one moment elections and constituent service, at
another, stakeholder engagement and negotiation, or transparency. The result is ahttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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remarkablyhomogeneousglobalpoliticalorderoffragmentedgovernmentandlocal
politics, operating against the background of an economy organized to link things
together by detaching them from the very spatial and communal identiﬁcations
withwhich governmentstruggles tointensifyits connection.
Most notably, of course, this vision has animated the organization of the world’s
politicallifeintotheseriesofostensiblyanalogousunitscalled‘nation-states’.Again,
more idea than reality, yet ruling political classes across the world have become
convinced that the world is made up of states and that those who rule have or
representone.Thepopularmediasurelyencouragestheviewthattheday’s‘politics’
is focused by whatever the president – or his opponent – did. Although political
leaders all speak about the distinctive and exceptional qualities of ‘their’ state,
they also share the view that their role as leader of a city, province, ministry, or
commission is analogous to all the others of its type. This double conviction –
analogousroles,distinctiveconstituencies,andspecializations–isthetemplatefor
their political activity despite the implausibility of both ideas. The ‘roles’ of heads
of state or ministers differ wildly whatever the diplomatic protocol may say, just
as those most committed to the distinctiveness of political jurisdictions are often
those who represent them, as any trip to the Washington ofﬁces of American state
representativeswillquicklyafﬁrm.
Nevertheless,theseideashavespawnedaseriesoftechnicalandinstitutionalpro-
jectswhichhaveconsolidatedagovernmentmonopolyonpoliticallifeinoneafter
anotherlocation,empoweringsomeanddisempoweringotherswhiledemobilizing
alternative institutional arrangements and afﬁliations. At the national level, for ex-
ample,asthepolitycametomeanthestate,peoplewerereconstitutedasindividual
citizens of speciﬁc states – a process requiring a range of technical innovations in
identiﬁcation from passports to voting privileges. A popular and professional ver-
nacular of civil and human ‘rights’ redeﬁned justice as an appropriate relationship
between an individual and a state. The demands of linguistic and other minorities
were accommodated either by recognizing their demands for political autonomy
through secession or, more commonly, assimilating them into a national polity as
citizens with enforceable individual and minority rights. Smaller territorial units –
cities, neighbourhoods, states – were placed in a hierarchical relationship to larger
national units, relations between them managed by professional interpretation of
doctrines like ‘subsidiarity’, ‘states rights’, ‘home rule’, and the like. Intermediate
civic institutions that might once have played a political role – professional guilds,
unions, tribes – were either assimilated to national political parties or transformed
into cultural and economic rather than political institutions, their members un-
leashedtoengagewiththenationalpoliticalworldasindividuals.Atthesametime,
theemergenceofanationalmediacreatedanationalpoliticalconversation,reﬂect-
ing the activity of government back as the privileged site of politics as political
parties arose to serve as gatekeepers for the apparatus and personnel of political
life. In the end, politics everywhere came to be deﬁned as the activity of specialized
peoplewho haveoraspireto havegovernmentpowerin states.
The fantasy arrangement of the political world into ‘states’ also equated world
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governments, reimagined from this perspective as parallel ‘sovereigns’. The devel-
opment of a horizontal conversation among them, whether carried on by word
or deed, led to the emergence of a transnational political class of diplomats and
‘non-governmental’ representatives of ‘civil society’ whose members understand
their local and global situations to be somehow analogous. Their interaction has
encouraged and has been encouraged by the emergence of a common global me-
dia conversation in which all these people may imagine themselves participating.
The emergence of a transnational diplomatic class – including the transnational
community of international lawyers – has reinforced a shared vernacular for inter-
national political discourse and action, ﬁne-tuning its limits, possibilities, and dir-
ections. Indeed, the most striking thing about ‘world politics’ today is the extent to
whichitisunderstoodtobeabouttherelationsamongnationalinstitutionsasthey
unfold among specialized professionals – diplomats, soldiers, and national polit-
ical leaders. All the other social activity that occurs around the world is something
else – commercialactivityorculturalactivityperhaps,butnot‘politics’.
2.3. The result:inequality,instability,andpoliticaldysfunction
It might seem that a world of national politics and global economics would be ripe
for conﬂict between the two. It is often said that in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth
centurythestrugglebetweenthemwas‘won’bynationalpolitics,withcatastrophic
economic consequences, just as it is now sometimes said that the global economy
has defeated the potential for meaningful national politics. There is something to
both claims, certainly. But more interesting, I believe, are the consequences of their
often unequal relationship as it has been sustained over time. If economics means
efﬁcientmarketsandpoliticsmeansdemocracyandtheruleoflaw–theseallseem
likegoodideas.Itisappealingtothinkthattheygotogethernaturally,orthatmove-
menttowardonemightstartavirtuouscycletowardtheother.Thiswayofthinking
is extremely common among the economic and political professionals who must
manage the differences between them. When problems arise, professionals in each
area typically respond by calling for more of both – ever more integrated economic
markets and ever more responsive and specialized government: more democracy,
more efﬁcient markets, both promoted by more rule of law. Where their logics
threaten to diverge, the professional challenge is to build intermediate institutions
and doctrinal schemes for the technical accommodation of national politics to a
global economy and for a satisfying management of the interface between them.
The trade regime is the most obvious example – a set of economic and political
commitments, doctrines and interpretive institutions designed to encourage na-
tionalpoliticalsupportforglobaleconomicactivityandeconomicaccommodation
ofdivergentnationalpoliticalsettlements.
Unfortunately, technical management of the tensions between these grand pro-
jects has accelerated the distance between politics and the public interest while
liberating economic life from the social and political context necessary for its suc-
cessfulstabilizationandmanagement,inakindofperversefeedbacklooporvicious
spiral,encouragingpoliticalimpotenceandhyperbolealongsideeconomicinequal-
ity and instability. Think of Europe. Politics responded to the local demand forhttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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growth by ceding ever more territory to a distant economic technocracy which in
turndemandedeverfurtherdemobilizationoflocalpolicyspaceinthenameofthe
technocratic imperatives of reform and austerity until the local political arrange-
mentsbegantoimplode.Acrosstheworld,theproblemscallingoutforpublicpolicy
attention are ever more rooted in global economic movements and ever less amen-
abletosolutiononthescaleofourpoliticallife.Governmenteverywhereisbuffeted
byeconomicforces,capturedbyeconomicinterests,engagedineconomicpursuits.
The inability of politics to offer public-interest solutions to policy challenges has
encouraged political cultures ever less interested in doing so. Politics has come to
be about other things – symbolic and allegorical displays, on the one hand, and the
featheringofnests, onthe other.
The resulting instability of contemporary political and economic life has mani-
fested itself in a variety of ways since the economic crisis. At the top and bottom of
the world economy, people have deracinated themselves, moving ever more often
across ever greater distances. In relative terms, the middle classes are the ones who
have become locked to their territory. For so long the national centre of political
gravity, the middle classes of the advanced industrial democracies have become a
global periphery, their new political and economic impotence expressing itself in
wayswhichfurtherdestabilizepoliticallifeandeconomiclife.Governmentsevery-
wherenowoperateintheshadowofdisenfranchisedanddisillusionedpublicswho
have lost faith in the public hand – in its commitment to the ‘public interest’, in its
sovereignty, its relevance, its capacity to grasp the levers that affect the conditions
of social justice or economic possibility. In the face of integrated supply chains,
global markets and ﬁnancial uncertainty, workers, corporations, and banks – all
turntothenation-stateforredress,bailout,support–onlytoﬁndthereisoftenlittle
their sovereign will do. Just as the global economy has no ‘commanding heights’,
so the political system has no sovereign centre. The institutional structure for each
hasbeen brokenup.Politicallifehasdriftedintoneighbourhoodandtransnational
networks, been diffused into the capillaries of professional management, and con-
densedinthelaserbeamofmediafashion,transformedintoaunifying,ifimpotent,
spectacle.Fromtheinsidelookingout,oneﬁndsoneselfbuffetedbyonethingafter
another– professionalcommonsense chastens themostrobust partyplatformand
only the wholesale replacement of politicians by ‘technocrats’ seems capable of ap-
peasing economic forces. From the outside looking in, however, the centre seems
captured,craven,conspiratorial.
Onlyrarelycanagoodsolutionbereverseengineeredfromcriticalidentiﬁcation
of the problem. Nevertheless, this interpretation of the current political economic
dilemmasuggestsathoughtexperiment.Whatwouldhappenwerethegovernance
professions suddenly reoriented to reversing these two large-scale projects? Ima-
gine the daily management of political and economic life aimed in broad terms to
reconnect the political and the economic by revising the sinews of legal, institu-
tional, and intellectual life through which they have been separated. Imagine the
ruling elites also aimed to reverse the technical consolidation of global economic
and political life by fragmenting the space of economic activity and multiplying
the modes through which politics is undertaken. These broad projects might alsohttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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be mutually reinforcing. For example, the intermediate institutional forms which
could fragment economic space and disrupt the consolidation of national political
lifemayalsoopen spaces fora reconnection ofpoliticswitheconomics.
Such a programme would be familiar to the world’s leading risk managers, who
have seen the dangers of overintegration in economic life. Financial risk man-
agement requires the reintroduction of stopgaps and go-slow provisions against
the damage of contagion and the volatility of speculative ﬂows. Supply-chain risk
management required the reintroduction of inventories to guard against the dis-
ruptions of a tsunami here, a nuclear accident there. Imagine continuing on this
path, reintroducing institutional forms for economic life linked to territory and
to the constituencies whose economic and political possibilities rise and fall with
theirlocation–publicunions,publiclyownedenterprises,corporateformsrespon-
sive to public policy as well as shareholder proﬁt, banking and credit reoriented
to local economic development. Large-scale regional institutions – central banks,
development banks – might be reorganized to be more responsive to diverse local
economicandpoliticalimperatives,theirinvestmentsdelinkedfromworldmarket
benchmarks. At the same time the experts and professionals who adjust the terms
of global political and economic life might aim to strengthen the potential of local
politics to pursue their own path. It is not impossible to imagine how this could be
done. After all, in the political economy of today’s advanced industrial economies
a generation or two ago, the intermediary organizations that recently came to look
like pure economic irrationality – professional monopolies, corporations linked to
local stakeholders, unions forcing negotiations over the forms and costs of public
goods – were often also spaces of political engagement. Reinventing such arrange-
mentswouldrequirethatwereimaginelawlessasacommonlanguageofeconomic
and politicalintegrationthanas ashield foralternativepaths and powers.
This is simply a thought experiment – a utopian heuristic. People can imagine
doingit–indeed,insomeareasitisalreadybeingdone–althoughitwouldradically
alterthebackgroundassumptionswhichinformtheroutineprofessionalpracticesof
botheconomicsandpolitics.Thoughtexperimentslikethisareimportantprecisely
because they focus attention on the large-scale background ideas experts carry
around in their heads about what politics or economics are about, where they are
heading, and how law ﬁts in. If rulership professionals, including international
lawyers,aretodeveloptheanalytichabitsandperspectivesnecessarytounderstand
and remap the political economy of the world, they will need to break free of the
technical agendas whichorientthe workoftheprofessions.
It is important to try. When the world’s managers focus only on the technical
issues of institutional form or regulatory policy which their professional discip-
lines mark out for attention, they are not simply rearranging the deckchairs on a
vulnerable world – they are part of the process by which the world unravels. The
legalizationofbothpoliticsandeconomicsmakeslegalinstitutionsandprofessional
practice the glue that constitutes these domains, allocates powers and incapacities
betweenthem,andcarvesthechannelsthroughwhichtheirseparationaccelerates.
Once this begins, law progressively locks in the gains, for it is the stakes as well
as the conduit for interactions between centres and peripheries. How this happenshttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
LAW AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD 21
can be traced in the stock of social and legal entitlements each group has been al-
located to participate in global economic life. As a result, I am convinced that legal
scholars have much to contribute to understanding how the political economy of
theworldhascomeundoneandwhatmightbedoneinresponse.Todoso,theywill
needtorejuvenatetwointellectualtraditions–thesociopoliticalorsocioeconomic
analysis of centre–periphery dynamics, and the critical analytics ﬁrst developed by
legalrealistsandsocio-legalvoicesacenturyagoanddevelopedoverthelastdecades
by a variety of critical, progressive, and postmodernist voices. I turn now to those
heterogeneous inheritances.
3. CENTRE–PERIPHERY ANALYTICS AND LEGAL REALISM:
DOORWAYS TO POLITICAL ECONOMY
The analysis of ‘centre–periphery dynamics’ has served as the portal to a variety
of different political and intellectual projects over the last half-century. A brief list
would include:
• A project in development economics to foreground the potential for national
(or international) economic management to staunch the effects of inter-
regional or international dependency and the ‘development of underdevel-
opment’,as scholarstermedit.
• A project in international politics or international relations to comprehend
the dynamics of ‘neo-colonial’ arrangements limiting the self-determination
ofnewly and nominally‘independent’nations.
• A political project in cultural psychology to understand the dynamics of as-
similation, self-marginalization, and rage in the periphery and complacency
atthe centre ofwhatscholars called the‘world system’.
• A project of historical recovery to trace the impact of the colonial legacy
in liberal internationalism and to decentre the European and North Atlantic
traditionsinthe disciplineofinternationallaw
Therewerecertainlyothers.‘Centre–peripherydynamics’opensthewayforsomany
critical projects precisely because so many mainstream frameworks edit out both
the periphery and the dynamics. Attention to centre–periphery relations opens a
window onto the structures of power and hierarchy in a larger system and onto
thecontinuationofwarintimesofpeacethroughthedynamicsofdominationand
reciprocalinﬂuence amongunequalactors insuch asystem.
Before turning to the relationship between political economy and international
law, it may be helpful to review in quite general terms what it takes to think about
‘centre–peripherydynamics’inaﬁeld.Mostobviously,youneedtoidentifya‘centre’
and a ‘periphery’ – of something. There needs to be a ﬁeld, a topography, a history, or
as y s t e mwithin which something is the centre and something else is the periphery.
This ﬁeld provides the coherence, holds the centre and periphery in a relationship.
Talking about centre–periphery dynamics forces you to say something about howhttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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this larger system functions and coheres. Is it an iron cage? A chaotic accident?
Something inbetween?
For some academic and professional disciplines, it is simply obvious that what
they are looking at is a ‘system’. In many ﬁelds, that idea has entered popular
consciousnessaswell.Economiststhinkof‘economies’assystemswhosedynamics
can be divined and modelled. By and large, so do laypeople. The popularization of
psychological ideas has made it common to think about our internal world as a
dynamic economy of desires, reasons, aspirations, pressures, prohibitions, and so
on. Family-therapy models crystallize the idea that families are social systems with
dynamicsspeciﬁc to eachfamilyand commontofamiliesacross theculture.
Thelegacyofacademicthinkingaboutinternationalrelationsandinternational
law is more ambivalent. In some sense, scholars in these ﬁelds do encourage the
notion that there is an international political system and an international legal
system.Foralmostacentury,however,scholarshipinbothﬁeldshasalsodisputedthe
ideathatthesethingsare‘systems’.Politicalscientistshavestressedthemultiplicity
andheterogeneityofpoliticallifeacrossdiverseinstitutionalandculturalforms,the
replacement of a systematic high politics by a communicative process embedded
in an unpredictable and chaotic social ﬁeld. For international lawyers, the point of
legalizing international relations has always been to replace a political system (say,
‘balance of power’) with a legal order among sovereigns. Getting there has required
reimaginingbothinternationalpoliticsandinternationallaw;breakingthemdown
intofunctionalpieces;placingtheminanongoinganddiffuseprocessofargument
and collective legitimation; dispersing them across myriad actors, stakeholders,
participantsinaninternationallegal/politicalprocess;embracingacomprehensive
legal pluralism. Taken together, focus on legal pluralism, fragmentation, and the
dispersion of politics throughout social and institutional life has undone the idea
thateitherpoliticsorlawcoheresasa‘system’.Itisasifthepoliticalsystemcouldbe
replaced by a legal order only at the expense of both systematicity and orderliness.
The result is an open-ended process of competition among all manner of interests
whichsometimesmanagetocongealintowhatcanatbestbeinterpretedasmedium-
scale ‘systems’ organizing an economic sector, region, or domain of activity, prone
tooverlap,conﬂict,anddisintegrationastheyinteract.Thislegacymakesitdifﬁcult
to take the ﬁrst step toward dynamic interpretation of centre–periphery dynamics
precisely because doing so requires what seems a step back to the more primitive
ideathatthere is,afterall,some kindofsystem.
The erosion of professional attachment to the systematicity of global life was
accompanied by the rise of a technocratic and practical sensibility that has trans-
formed rulership. Ruling is not about grasping the controlling levers of a system or
exercisingwhatWeberfamouslycalledthevocationofpolitics.1 Rulersnowoccupy
functional roles, have delegated competences, deploy technical tools and instru-
ments to address concrete problems. Rulers have become experts, spoken by their
expertise. They operate in a context, but they need not attend to any larger system.
1 M.Weber,‘PoliticsasaVocation’, inWeber,Essaysin Sociology (ed.H. Garth and C.Mills) (1946), 26at 45.http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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Norareconﬂictanddistributioncentraltotheirwork–thepointisratherproblem
solving, whether in small steps or bold gestures. Day by day,they inch toward com-
pletion of a model city, an international Potemkin village of functional equivalents
for ideal-typical national political arrangements. Out there, vaguely surrounding
their activity, are various constitutional arrangements, institutional settlements,
politicalexpectations,economicforces,culturalfashions–theirtechnocraticworld
driftsina hazeofsystem fragments.
Attention to centre–periphery dynamics in this fragmented fog is a way of
reawakening the idea of system and focusing on conﬂict, domination, hierarchy.
Indeed,theonlysystematicelementwewouldneedtobegintomakesenseofglobal
political economy is a kind of permanently ﬂoating centre–periphery dynamic
which will open the door to a reimagination of the system as a system. Centre–
periphery analytics constitute a systemic ﬁeld by assigning positions to things
‘within’itandtracingtheinteractions,conﬂicts,andhierarchiesamongthem.Seen
thisway,the‘system’islessafactintheworld,heldtogetherbyaconstitutionspelling
outactorsandstructures,thananinterpretation.Astoryaboutthewaythingsbunch
together in uneven patterns and affect one another over time. More conventional
narrativesarealso,ofcourse,stories.Buttheyarestorieswhichoccludeattentionto
the dynamics of power and hierarchy. The point of developing a centre–periphery
narrative is to juxtapose an account that foregrounds those elements, challenging
the conventionalaccounts thatsomehowmetabolizethem.
As elements in an interpretive story, the metaphor of ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’
can refer to just about anything: ideas, regions, nations, groups. The point is the
relationship–arelationshipthatcanbespatial,temporal,orjustamatterofmental
emphasis.Theperipherycanbe‘faraway’fromthecentre,‘morebackwardthan’or
‘historicallypriorto’thecentre,orsimplylesssigniﬁcant,lessamatteroffocusand
attention thanthecentre. Allthese areasymmetricrelationships,hierarchies.
Thecentre–peripherymetaphorimpliesamodel,anideal-typicalpicture,ofhow
centresandperipheriesinteract.Scholarshavegenerallyusedthemetaphortoassert
relationshipsatonceofdifferenceandhierarchy.Thingsthatareuptodate,nearby,
are also more important or privileged or powerful. Centres have more agency. The
structure favours them. Centres exercise powers, get stuff, have status that is not
available to peripheries. Perhaps the centre also does bad things to the periphery.
Perhaps it keeps the periphery peripheral – or makes it ever more peripheral. That
kind ofthing iswhatcentres do.
Thedangerhereisthetendencytoexaggeratetheclarityandcausaldeterminacy
ofthemodel–andtheabilitytotranslategeneralitiesabout‘centresandperipheries’
to whatever is saddled with these labels. Although centres sometimes impoverish
or oppress peripheries, sometimes they do not. Sometimes they may lift them up.
And sometimes their relative positions are a function of something else entirely –
some other system or interest or force that keeps them in such a relationship. The
trickhere isto rehabilitatetheideaofa systemwithoutthe baggage ofnecessity.
Moreover, it is one thing to assert that there is a system and quite another to
explain how it works. This requires spelling out with some speciﬁcity just what
renders the one thing peripheral to the other; how are they differentiated in social,http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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economic, cultural terms; how they then relate to one another; and how various
social and material forces generate a dynamic between them. I have long found
GunnarMyrdal’sextremelylooseanalyticframeworkforthinkingabouteconomic
and social dynamics useful here.2 If we start with economic dualism – the city and
the countryside, the wealthy north and the poorer south, the inner city and the
suburbs, the industrial and agricultural sectors – it is hard to know just what will
happen.Certainlygoodthingsinonecanwreakhavocontheother.Awealthyregion
can draw investment, people, and energy toward it, making it ever more difﬁcult
for a poorer region to move ahead. But wealth in one region can also stimulate
growthelsewhere.Thepointisthatbad–orgood–thingsineitherthecentreorthe
peripherycanhaveapositiveoranegativeeffectontheother.Italldepends.Depends
on all kinds of things – from attitudes and institutions to politics. Myrdal orients
theanalysistoidentifyingthelinkages,understandingthedynamicsofpositiveand
negativeeffects,viciousandvirtuouscycles,relativelystableequilibria,andtipping
points through which good or bad things in one have an effect in the other. His
method is less an analytic than a list: a list of effects that can arise between a centre
anda periphery.
The dynamic dimension is crucial. Statically, it is easy to imagine that things are
stable, in equilibrium. Or that the system moves as a whole – growth lifts the rich
andthepoor,perhapsunequally,buttogether.Itturnsout,however,thatwhenyou
turn on the switch, all kinds of interactions between the centre and the periphery
disrupttheequilibriumandthreatenthenotionofthesystemmovingasone.When
things work well, an equilibrium disrupting increase in wealth in one place can
stimulate growth elsewhere. When they do not, inequalities and hierarchies may
reproduce themselves or become worse. Good intentions have unanticipated bad
consequences,surprisingfeedbackloopsarise,secondaryeffectssetin,andsoonwe
are in a vicious spiral. Virtues spawn vices. Which way things will go – or whether
they willmoveatallin relationshiptoone another–dependson thelinkages.
This way of thinking blunts the temptation to hunt for large-scale narratives of
necessityeitherfortheeconomyasawholeorfortherelationshipbetweenitsdual
elements. The focus is on mid-level social formations. On the macro side, there is
dualism – two subsystems sufﬁciently differentiated from one another to operate
somewhatindependently.Andtherearelinkages–sinewsofinteractionwhichcan
strengthenandweaken.Thesemoremicro-processesdevelopdynamicsoftheirown.
Thisiswherelawcomesin.Legalrulesandinstitutionsaresinewsofconnection
and distribution among subsystems. As a result, attention to law can clarify how
centres and peripheries come to be differentiated, as well as the micro-processes
that operate to link them. A variety of heterogeneous traditions in legal thought
offer tools for identifying these linkages and the channels which structure the
dynamic relations among actors in divergent starting positions. The critical and
realist traditions in legal scholarship which stress the role of legal entitlements in
constituting actors, allocating rents, and establishing patterns of bargaining power
2 See, for example, G. Myrdal, An Approach to the Asian Drama: Methodological and Theoretical Selections from
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offerapowerfulleverforgraspingthemid-levelrelationshipsofdifferentiationand
inﬂuence.3Socio-legaltraditionsfocusattentionontheimpactoflegalarrangements
onhumanbehaviour–andviceversa.Thevarietyofpostmoderninﬂuenceswhich
entered the legal academy over the last decades foreground the communicative,
constitutive, and performative effects of law in social life. Taken together, these
traditionsshiftanalyticfocusawayfromthestructureandconstitutionof‘thelegal
order’ toward the role of law, legal institutions, and legal ideas in the hard and soft
distributionofentitlements,authority,andbargainingvulnerabilitiesamongactors
withinaneconomicorpoliticalsystem,andtotheroleoflawinthemicro-processes
ofglobalpoliticaland economic struggle.
Inthissense,centre–peripheryisnotastrongmodelofpowerordominationfocused
ontheidentiﬁcationofagency,causation,andeffect.Itisamodelofrelativepositions
in a ﬁeld and the dynamics which develop between them over time. The point is
notthatthecentredoesthisorthattotheperiphery.Theactorsherearepeople.The
systemic element and the dynamics between centre and periphery arise from what
they do. Some system of norms, ideas, and expectations, enforced in some way by
violence or habit, by shame or charisma, permits actual people situated here to do
this and there to do that. The power that drives the whole thing, if we can speak of
power in that way, runs orthogonal to the ﬁeld and is exercised as people do things
in the shadow of those ideas, expectations, and authorities. Power rests with the
system of entitlements that links people in relationships of relative privilege and
vulnerability with the habits of society, with the ideas, aims, and identities of the
participants themselves, and with the objectives and enforcement authority of the
state.Aspeopleactintheshadowoftheseauthoritiesandconstraints,thecomplex
reciprocalrelationsbetween centres and peripheriesunfold.
Themodestmid-levelanalyticsofMyrdalareusefultodevelopachecklistofboth
salutaryandperverselinks,paradoxicalorunexpectedeffects,viciousandvirtuous
cycles that can then unfold. A legal focus on the role of background entitlements
in the socio-legal dynamics between actors in an economy or a political order is
a useful heuristic for identifying the linkages. In a legal system, entitlements to
rents are, broadly speaking, the glue that distributes. Finding the entitlement – and
the expectations unleashed in the shadow of entitlement – identiﬁes the hand of
power. Just as ﬁnding the distributive hand of the state in the routine operations of
privatelawadjudicationhighlightsthepresenceofcoercioninwhatmayotherwise
seem an equitable process of bargaining and exchange. Doctrinal and institutional
arrangements encourage the accumulation of gains, reinforcing the asymmetry.
Seen this way, tendentious diagnostics do not require an iron cage. Small rules
and good intentions can generate entitlements that reproduce or ameliorate social
inequalities as they radiate out through a system structured by centre–periphery
asymmetries.
AlthoughMyrdaldevelopedhismethodtodescribelinkagesamong‘economies’,
it is easy to see that such an approach may also shed light on asymmetric relations
3 D.Kennedy, ‘The Stakes ofLaw, orHale and Foucault!’,(1991)XV(4)Legal StudiesForum327.http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
26 DAVID KENNEDY
in the worlds identiﬁed as ‘political’. It is common to think of law – public as well
as private – as a tool for distributing political authority. Understanding the role of
entitlements or legal competences in structuring asymmetric political bargaining
and exchange is but a small step. Indeed, such an approach would seem altogether
compatible with the disaggregated and distributed understanding of law that has
cometodominatetheinternational-lawﬁeld.Myrdal’smid-levelanalyticsembraced
the disorderly pluralism and fragmentation of social, economic, and political life.
That did not eliminate the potential for dualism, for linkages, for spillovers, for
the capture of rents and the reinforcement of bargaining power, for vicious – or
virtuous – cycles. Far from it. It just makes them harder to ﬁnd, the mechanics of
their operation harder to isolate. The critical and heterogeneous traditions in legal
thoughtgive usaplace tolook forthose mechanics.
It is nevertheless surprising how rarely international-law scholars focus on the
distributive impact of local, national, and international legal rules in the global
economy,comparedtotheenormousenergydevotedtothequixoticefforttoexplain
howitallmayonedayadduptoacoherent,constitutedlegalorder.Theexplanation,I
amconvinced,liesintwounfortunateideas.First,theideathatinternationallawyers
shouldnotfocusonissuesofpoliticaleconomy.Economicsisforsomeoneelse,politics
precisely what one hopes to beat into the ploughshares of legal order. And second,
the idea that questions of political economy can best be answered either by large-
scale narratives of historical necessity – the nature of capitalism, and so forth –
or by ethnographies and micro-sociological study of the impact of ‘globalization’
on very particular communities and transactions. The approach I propose differs
from both, engaging international lawyers in questions of political economy and
focusingonthemiddlerange.Theideaistousethebackgroundworldoflawandlegal
expertise as a window for interpreting the foreground of world political economy.
Thehypothesisisthatlawoffersanindexoftoolsandstakesforinteractionbetween
centres and peripheriesin theworld politicaleconomic system.
This way of thinking might also illuminate asymmetric relationships among
more symbolic ‘systems’ of ideas, disciplinary sensibilities, or national traditions.
A focus on the ways in which institutional forms migrate between centres and
peripheries could harness comparative legal inquiry to questions of political econ-
omy.Comparativelawnowoscillatesbetweenreﬂectiononmacro-questionsoffunc-
tionalequivalenceamonglegalculturesorpatternsofinﬂuenceandtransplantation
among broad legal traditions or ‘families’, on the one hand, and micro-questions of
alternativetechnicalsolutionstoproblemscommonamongmodernindustrialeco-
nomies found in different national regimes, on the other. The goal of the inquiry is
ofteneithertoexpandtherangeofplausiblenationalsolutionsortosearchfora‘best
practice’thatmightbegeneralized.InthewakeofMyrdal,Iwouldhopecomparative
legal scholars might rather focus on the asymmetric interactions between the legal
ideasandinstitutionsoflegalculturesincentresandperipheries,andontheroleof
legalsimilarities,differences,andinﬂuencesinreproducingorcontestingrelations
between politicaland economic centres and peripheries.
To the extent our world is governed by the ideas and practices of experts, it
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ideas,disciplinesorﬁeldsofexpertisewhicharemoreorlessdominant,prestigious,
or central. In the development ﬁeld, for example, there is no question economics
has been in the driver’s seat for more than 50 years compared to law or other
social sciences. The dynamics of the relationship between economics and law in
the expertise of development policy makers has some of the characteristics of a
centre and a periphery. In repeated waves, an increasingly robust economic model
has come to dominate the ﬁeld, exogenizing law, governance, and much else, only
to ﬁnd itself chastened by an inability to translate its analytics successfully into
policy. At such points, economics has reached out wildly to law, institutions, and
governance, endogenizing one after another aspect of social and political life. In
both directions, development economics has overshot the mark – exogenizing law
andgovernanceinthenameofrobustanalyticstothepointofabstractsterility,only
to endogenize law and institutions so indiscriminately that a general call for ‘good
law’,‘strongentitlements’,and‘humanrights’stiﬂestheabilitytomakechoicesand
establish priorities.
Such patterns of interaction between disciplines are not only the unfolding of a
logic,apendulumbetweenrobustexogenizingmodelsandcontext-speciﬁcembrace
of institutions. Relations between more or less dominant professional disciplines
are also matters of reciprocal inﬂuence and competition. It would be interesting
to know what norms or entitlements structure the relationship between economic
common sense (a disciplinary ‘centre’) and common sense about law, governance,
and institutions, which has always been more peripheral to development policy.
Someofthismaybeafunctionofinstitutionalauthority,professionalresourcesand
prestige,andtheintellectualpath-dependenceofpolicyelites.Somemaybeamatter
ofideas.Itmaybe,forexample,thatasharedcommitmenttotheinstrumentalnature
oflawmightdistributeauthorityasymmetricallybetweeneconomicendsandlegal
means. A commitment by both disciplines to avoid seeing legal arrangements as a
terrain for political contestation and choice might have kept law peripheral even
when economists embrace good governance, formal property entitlements, or hu-
man rights as the very deﬁnition of development. Needless to say, these remain
hypotheses. The suggestion is that the diverse knowledge practices of experts may
alsobeunderstoodascentresandperipheriesinaﬁeld,theirrelationsdrivenbypro-
fessional ambitions, desires to afﬁliate and disafﬁliate, dominate and submit, and
structuredbystatushierarchies,institutionalarrangementsandhabitsofreciprocal
persuasiveness or impenetrability that function in ways analogous to the role of
entitlements shapingbargaining powersin thepoliticaland economiclife.
It is not only that symbolic systems have centres and peripheries. The ‘centres’
and ‘peripheries’ in economic, political, or legal systems may also be symbolic or
allegorical.Assuch,theyneedtobeinhabitedorperformed,andtheeffectofsucha
performance is not certain. Indeed, we might think of domination or hegemony as
a performance or assertion of centrality – or an ascription of peripherality – which
gives rise, in a signiﬁcant audience, to the effect of centrality or peripherality. In
law,ithasbecomeroutinetoassessassertionsofjurisdictionfortheireffectiveness.
The extraterritorial effect of national jurisdiction is a function of the willingness
to assert it and the ability to generate cooperation or acquiescence in its exercise.http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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Internationallawyersareaccustomedtospeakingabouttheauthorityofnormsasa
matteroftheirpersuasiveeffect,thelegalityofpoliticalactivityasafunctionofthe
legitimacy with which it is viewed by the international community, its legitimacy
a function, in turn, of its perceived legality. It is odd that this way of imagining
legal powers and obligations has so rarely given rise to analyses of the relative
persuasiveness or legitimacy of performances from divergent quarters. And yet it
seems undeniable that legitimacy and persuasiveness can be both cause and effect
of being ‘the centre’. When the United States makes an assertion to its European
allies that the power it wields in one or another disputed context is the exercise of
right, what is at stake is not only the one-off legitimacy of the act or persuasiveness
of the claim, but also the relative position of European and American authorities
in a norm-drenched political system. To say that international law is a ‘game of
the middle powers’ is to say that European nations more readily ﬁnd themselves
occupying the symbolic centre of the global legal order than of the global military
or even economic system. Their normative assertions persuade, their action – or
inaction –seems legitimate.
Whywouldthisbeinteresting?ForMyrdalthegoalwasimprovedpolicy–what
canbedone,wherearethelevers,howcaneconomicanalysisbemobilizedbyplan-
ners to encourage upward trends and discourage downward spirals? He imagines a
site where these things could be understood and encouraged or contravened – the
planning agency, the public hand. And indeed, if you are a policy planner, this kind
of sceptical, middle-level analytic can be particularly useful. No big story, just an
orientation to the kinds of things that might play out among social and economic
aggregates and suggestions fordynamicstohelporhinder.
Atthegloballevel,fewscholarstodaywritewiththismuchfaithintheavailability
of a public policy hand. Centre–periphery analytics are deployed more often to
criticize than to focus policy proposals. The impetus is less reform than diagnosis,
to raise awareness of contestation in the warp and woof of the quotidian. Centre–
peripheryanalyticsareusefulincriticalendeavourspreciselybecausetheyreframe
disciplines grown comfortable with constitutional stability and modest reform to
focus onthe reproductionofasymmetricpower.
Criticismisarhetoricalbusiness.Thecentreandtheperipheryarepositionsthat
must be claimed, denied, asserted, or attributed. It is them and us – and we, we are
theperiphery!(Or,anyway,itiswewhoafﬁrmtheirmarginalityandrepresenttheir
interests.)Thedangerhereisthetendencytooverstate.Analysisoftherelationship
betweenacentreandaperipheryseemsmosteffectiveascriticismwhenthecentre
and periphery are hard-wired by history, when the centre has all the stuff, exercises
allthepower,reproducesthehierarchy.Thegoldstandardforcriticism,inthissense,
is the iron cage. Where the whole arrangement is loose and unstable, or the results
justalucky–orunlucky–coincidence,thecriticalstingseemslesspotent.Itmight
actually be an iron cage, of course. But maybe not. Things can go poorly even when
the periphery captures the spoils, inheriting the moral pleasures of marginality, or
relief from the burdens of rulership. Indeed, the most interesting hierarchies, the
most obdurate dominations, can arise where power does not simply ﬂow downhill
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reason for thinking that centres will always oppress peripheries. Sometimes there
arevirtuouscycles and allboats dorise.
Critical claims to peripherality and allegations of centrality must overcome the
backgroundcomplacencywhichcomesfromthinkingthereisnosystem–orevery-
one is, in some sense, on the same footing. It no longer seems that the ‘system’ has
a ‘logic’ any more than that history marches to a dialectic. Much is coincidence.
Oftenthereareunanticipateddisturbances,externalshocks,puzzlingreversals,and
creativereinventions.Toclaimthatthisisperipheraltothatrequiresasuspensionof
awareness of life’s complexity, irrationality, and unpredictability. Even then, it can
bedifﬁculttotelljustwhoisthecentreandwhoistheperiphery.Therearecentresin
the periphery, peripheries in the centre. More importantly, perhaps, centres can feel
peripheral, style themselves marginal, bemoan their distance from power. And in
everyfamilywecanidentifytheperipheraldramaqueensaroundwhoseinstability
and weakness the entire family rotates. In the end, centre–periphery analytics are
both interpretations – this is how things are – and, when the interpretation holds,
persuades,reconﬁguresthesituation,interventions.Tocallouttheperpetualdrama
queen victim on his centrality is to name and to shame, whether the ostensible
victimis anadolescent oranation.
Centre–peripheryanalyticsprovideaframeworkforcriticizingthestatusquoby
asserting the presence of a power and a hierarchy that is otherwise denied. To the
extent the political and economic world has come to be managed by experts, the
hierarchiesandpowerdynamicsofcontemporarylifeareoftendeniedbytheroutine
sensibility,beliefsystem,andpracticesofexpertprofessions.Centre–peripheryana-
lyticscanalsobeusefulinscrutinizingthecomplacencyofanintellectualdiscipline
orprofessionalsensibility,mostpowerfullybyarticulatingascandalinaprofession’s
relationshiptopower,uncoveringaprofession’simplicationinproducinghierarch-
ies iteither deniesexist orclaimstobe subverting.
Thiscanoftenhappenwhenaﬁeldisconﬁdentithasinequalityundercontrol–
either because it is not bothered by the inequality or believes it offers a remedy. For
example,itwouldnothavebeenaparticularlytrenchantcritiqueofthosewhobuilt
the colonial system to demonstrate that it spawned hierarchies between centres
andperipheries–thatwasthewholepointoftheoperation.Exposureofadynamic
inequality between the imperial centre and the colonial periphery might have
scandalizedthosewhobelieveditwasalldonefromnoblesseobligeorastheexpression
ofhumanitarianandreligiousmotive,buteventheyprobablyunderstoodwhatwas
going on – that was precisely why their own good ministrations were needed. It
would be a scandal, however, if those ministrations were part of the mechanism by
which the dynamic inequality between the imperial centre and colonial periphery
were heightened or reproduced. Where the presence of humanitarian actors and a
religiousjustiﬁcationcanbeshowninfacttohavebeenalinkinthesocioeconomic
process bywhich thecentre exploitedthe periphery,youhaveascandal.
For international law, colonialism is not a scandal so long as the discipline can
say,‘obviouslycolonialismwasterrible,butwegotridofitandareworkingtoundo
itslegacy’.Norisitascandaltodemonstratethatinternationaldoctrinesarticulated
then or now were unrealistic – the native populations were not really treated ashttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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equally‘human’andsovereignsarenotreally‘equal’.Internationallawyers,thenas
now,knowthis.That’swhattheyareagainst.Thatisthereasontoseparatethegood,
ifimaginary,worldofinternationallawfromthebadworldofinternationalpolitics,
andforredoublingeffortstobringabouttheprogressivecivilizationofthosepolitics
bylaw.Itisascandal,however,ifitturnsoutinternational-lawdoctrinesproclaiming
thehumanityofindigenouspeoplesortheequalityofsovereignsastheyareapplied
are in fact part of the machinery by which the slaughter of indigenous peoples was
justiﬁedortheinequalityofnationshasbeensustained.AntonyAnghiemakesjust
suchaclaimaboutinternationallawfromthesixteenthtothetwentiethcenturies:
humanistdoctrines,doctrinesofpositiveequality,institutionsofafﬁrmativedevel-
opment, have all in fact functioned to sustain and heighten global inequality.4 To
the extent the inequality of centre and periphery in the world system is structural,
international law is part of the structure. When international law turns out to be
colonialismbyanothername–thename‘self-determination’–wehavescandal,for
self-determinationis justwhatthe disciplinefeltithadtoofferas aremedy.
Recent work on European law is also harnessing centre–periphery analytics to
criticize the dominant professional consciousness of European law professionals.
For professional Europeanists, it is not scandalous to hear that despite the ‘single
market’, European national economies and regions remain unequal and distinct.
They know that. The whole point of extending the four economic freedoms –
and of the ‘cohesion’ and ‘structural’ fund-transfer payment systems – is to ensure
that through integration economic growth is possible throughout the Union. The
EU project is all about linking centres and peripheries to equalize and grow. As a
result, it does pose a critical challenge to the European law ﬁeld to show that the
general legal principles – like ‘free movement’ or ‘social considerations’ – at the
core of the endeavour are applied in ways which heighten the inequality between
the economies of the European centre and periphery.5 The devil here is in the
details – in the precise ways that universal principles turn out to have diverse
meanings and get applied in ways that contribute to dualism. Or in the speciﬁc
ways a universal programme designed to equalize relations across the EU turns
outtoaccentuatethedistancebetweenthecentreandperiphery.Forexample,ifthe
structuralandcohesionfundseffectedanettransferfromaperipherytoacentre,orif
generalpoliciesadoptedinthenameof‘democratization’,‘ruleoflaw’,or‘economic
development’ aiming to bring the periphery into harmony with the centre had
theeffect,attheperiphery,ofunderminingparliamentarydemocracy,encouraging
deindustrialization, strengthening the security state, and the like, there would be
4 A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (2007) (arguing generally that while
internationallawsawitselfaspreoccupiedwithextendingauniversalnormativeordertoevermoresovereign
equals,itwasactuallypreoccupiedwithmanagingthedynamicsbetweenunequalcivilizationsorcultures).
5 Damjan Kukovec’s ongoing doctoral work argues precisely this. See Damjan Kukovec, ‘Whose So-
cial Europe?’, talk delivered at Harvard Law School (16 April, 2010), available at www.harvardiglp.org/
new-thinking-new-writing/whose-social-europe-the-lavalviking-judements-and-the-prosperity-gap; Dam-
jan Kukovec, ‘A Critique of the Rhetoric of Common Interest in the EU Legal Discourse’, talk delivered at
HarvardLawSchool(13April2012),availableatwww.harvardiglp.org/new-thinking-new-writing/a-critique-
of-rhetoric;andDamjanKukovec,‘ACritiqueoftheRhetoricofCommonInterestintheEULegalDiscourse’,
SJDdissertation, HarvardLaw School,forthcoming.http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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as c a n d a l . 6 In each of these cases, the villain is not the centre – it is the glue of
entitlementthatsetsupanasymmetricanddisempoweringdynamicandthecloak
ofself-narrationthatcovers itup.
4. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
International lawyers and legal scholars have much to contribute to understand-
ing and transforming global political economy. Heterogeneous strands within the
discipline have helped prepare the way for a more sustained focus on the role of
law in structuring relations among actors in the centre and in the periphery of the
worldeconomicandpoliticalsystem.Unfortunately,themainstreaminternational
legal academy has moved ever further from tackling such large-scale questions. It
is important to understand both how the discipline has insulated itself from polit-
icaleconomicengagementandwhatexistingcriticaltraditionscouldcontributeto
turning thingsaround.
4.1. Why is it so difﬁcult for a ﬁeld devoted to the law of the international
system toaddress issuesof globalpoliticaleconomy?
Since modern ‘international law’ emerged as a practical and scholarly profession
more than a century ago, it has aimed to civilize international politics with the
balm of normative regularity and rational dispute resolution rather than diagnose
and transform the political economy of the world. In moments of crisis – most
dramatically in the years after the First World War – some in the discipline have
offered international law as a terrain for renovating cultural and political life, but
such moments are rare. More often, international lawyers have taken the struc-
ture of economic life as understood by economists and the structure of political
life as understood by diplomats at a given moment for granted. Over the last few
decades, the internationalization of every technical legal ﬁeld – and the technical
specialization of international legal arrangements – has kept the legal profession
from considering grand questions about the role of law in the world’s political and
economic organization.
The theoretical issues that move the ﬁeld have always been small-bore adjust-
ments or reassessments of existing institutional arrangements – and of law’s own
statusinaworldofpoliticalfactsandeconomicforcesonesimplyhadtoaccept.Just
how and why and when do norms bind? Might stable behaviour be reinterpreted
as constitutionally compliant? Might existing transnational legislative, adminis-
trative, and adjudicative processes be adjusted to be more transparent or effective?
Nevertheless, a generation ago, the best comparative and public international law-
yerswereworldlyandcosmopolitan,theirdisinterestintheparochialdetailsofany
6 Ermal Frasheri makes this point in ‘Transformation and Social Change: Legal Reform in the Modernization
Process’, Nellco Legal Scholarship Repository, 9-5-2008; and in his ongoing doctoral work: ‘Of Knights
and Squires: European Union and the Modernization of Albania’, SJD dissertation, Harvard Law School,
forthcoming.http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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nation’slegalarrangementsmakingthemlonelyﬁguresinlawfacultieswhichwere
everywhere linkedto nationalpoliticalinstitutions andculturaltraditions.
In recent years, the relevance of a speciﬁcally international legal ﬁeld has be-
come harder to see as every national regulatory or private law subject matter has
been touched by international or foreign developments. Suddenly, everyone in the
legal academy is an internationalist – but none have the brief to analyse law’s role
in the world system. Their remit is focused on transnational dimensions of their
own ﬁeld. In Europe, legal scholars in every ﬁeld have become Europeanists, while
American law professors, from family law to intellectual property, have become
expert in the impact of their regime on the world and of the world on their regime.
Nationalregulatorysubjectswhichparticularlyseemtoimplicateglobaleconomic
life have blossomed as ﬁelds of their own – international banking and ﬁnance, in-
ternational or comparative antitrust, international taxation, and the like. Perhaps
most strikingly, even American constitutional law, that most isolated of academic
cargo cults, has become newly focused on the foreign-affairs power, on compliance
with international norms, on war powers and the regulation of war, and even on
the comparative study of systems thought loosely analogous – Canada, Australia,
South Africa, Israel, or the United Kingdom. As a result, the study of international
legalphenomenahasbecomelinkedtotheupsanddownsofnationallegalprojects
of public order, regulation, or private law enforcement. The issues are technical,
the perspective pragmatic problem solving. International legal study has become a
fragmented reﬂection of national policy concerns, as if becoming an international
lawyermeantbecoming aninternationalized AmericanorEuropeanlawyer,rather
than someone able to navigate a global legal order inﬁltrated by the transnational
extensions of multiple national legal arrangements but with its own political and
economic coherence.
Atthesametime,theinternational-lawﬁeldhasitselfrespondedtothemultipli-
cation and dispersion of legal authorities with global reach by repeatedly splitting
intoevermoretechnicalsubﬁelds,eachwithitsownfavouriteinstitutionalregime
and preferred disciplinary interlocutors. In some sense, modern international law
wassplitattheroot.Theﬁeldcameofageinthelatenineteenthcenturybyrepeated
division: ‘public international law’ from ‘private international law’, the ‘law of war’
fromthe‘lawofpeace’,the‘lawinwar’fromthe‘lawofwar’,andsoon.Althoughthe
distinctionsdidnotremainparticularlysharporformal,theprocessofdivisioncon-
tinuedthroughthetwentiethcentury.Anearlyandsigniﬁcantdisciplinarydivision–
public international law spawning international economic law – bore witness to a
momentin whichpoliticsand economics were comfortablyseparate.
Intheprocess,publicinternationallawbecameonespecializedﬁeldamongmany,
oriented to baseline rules about sources of law, the procedures and institutions of
inter-state diplomacy, and those substantive matters which had become the topic
of multilateral rule making – but not to the role of law in the large dramas of
global political and economic affairs. Instead, international law was preoccupied
with its own status as law in a political world – a concern it translated into endless
rumination on its ‘binding’ quality and the machinery of its ‘enforcement’. This
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procedures for making claims, settling disputes, enforcing law, and holding states
‘responsible’. The ﬁeld’s substantive energy focused only on domains which had
explicitly been the subject of binding international rules, from the environment
andhumanrightstotheuseofforceandtheregulationofarmedconﬂict.Assessing
the substantive impact of international law on the world political and economic
order meant measuring the impact of these positive norms. International law was
implicated in the protection and despoliation of the global environment to the
extent theKyotoProtocolappliedand was enforced,fullstop.
Although the ﬁeld may at ﬁrst have seemed foundational – both the base upon
whichallotherinternationallegalﬁeldswouldbebuiltandthelegalfoundationfor
globalpoliticalactivity–publicinternationallawsoondevelopedadistinctiveper-
spectiveandafarmorelimiteddomainofinterestandengagement.Thisencouraged
theclaimsbyotherinternationallegalﬁeldsthattheywereatleastasfoundational
to global legal order, if not more so. In the process any sense of the international
system’s politicalspeciﬁcitywas diluted.
Inthemiddleofthelastcentury,itmighthaveseemedtheﬁeldhaddiscovereda
pathtorenewal.Internationallaw’sbigmid-twentieth-centuryideas–transnational
law,policyscience,functionalism–framedasociologicalinquiryintotheoperations
oflawintheworldandopenedthedoortoadisaggregatedandlegalizedconception
ofthe‘globalpolicyprocess’.Theunfortunateresultwasareinterpretationoftrans-
nationalpoliticalandeconomicactivityinlegalandincreasinglytechnocraticterms.
The functional dispersion of ‘regulatory’, ‘administrative’ and ‘dispute resolution’
capacities spawned a wave of new scholarship seeking the effect of international
law wherever two are gathered in its name, dulling the professional experience
of a distinctive global framework linked to a global political or economic system.
Although ostensibly close to the diplomatic worlds of international organizations
andadjudication,itsinterdisciplinaryreferencepointsdrawnfrompoliticalscience,
internationalrelations,anddiplomatichistory,itsmissionbringinglawtotheworld
ofinter-statepower,thepublicinternational-lawﬁelddriftedeverfurtherfromfocus
on the political choices and distributional consequences of legal arrangements. As
public international law embraced the fragmentation of the international legal
ﬁeld, law became a way to speak about politics and politics a way to assert legal en-
titlements.Alongtheway,theaspirationtoofferadistinctiveglobalperspectiveon
the structure of the world political system withered and the experience of conﬂict,
decision, and responsibility were leeched out of our disciplinary images of global
order.
Atthesametime,theﬁeld’ssubstantivepreoccupationsbecameevermorespeciﬁc
and idiosyncratic. The ﬁeld promised that law would become the vernacular of
legitimacyaslegitimacybecamethecurrencyofpower–andwegotaproliferation
ofinternationaltribunalsfocusedonAfrica,anintensiﬁcationofpublicnamingand
shamingrearticulatingthedivisionbetweencivilizedandbarbaric,andadefenceof
everythingfrombombingandregimechangetolifewithoutparoleinthelanguage
of human rights. A steady focus on ‘crisis’ and ‘transition’ and ‘intervention’ has
made it ever more difﬁcult to pose questions about law’s role in the quotidian
structuresofconﬂictanddistributionembeddedintheeconomicandculturalglobalhttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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order. Rather than people taking responsibility for decisions, international lawyers
imagineadriftinggauzeofjudicialnetworksanddiffusestakeholderconversations
amongadisembodied‘internationalcommunity’aboutwhatitmightbelegitimate
to doaboutthis orthatunfoldingcrisis.
Meanwhile,‘internationaleconomiclaw’andarejuvenated‘privateinternational
law’ split off to become ﬁelds of their own. Leaving general inquiry into public
orderbehind,internationaleconomic lawfocusedon supportingtheintegrationof
a global market through the national and international regimes regulating trade.
Theinterdisciplinaryreferencepointshiftedfrominternationalpoliticstoeconom-
ics, but not in a way which encouraged focus on law as a link between centre and
periphery or as a distributive tool – rather the opposite. A set of ideas about the
economicsoftradeprovidedanorientationforinstitutionalanddoctrinaleffortsto
harness national regulatory machinery to the expansion of global markets and the
erosionofnationalorlocalpoliticalambitionstochallengetheirdistributionalim-
pact.‘Privateinternationallaw’focusedonthetransnationaleffectofprivaterights
and the procedures of transnational commercial arbitration. Private entitlements
are a crucial arena for investigation of the links which bind centres to peripheries
andstructureglobalpoliticaleconomy.Unfortunately,theﬁeldassiduouslyavoided
such questions, imagining the transnational private legal order as a space outside
‘publicpolicy’.
An international law responsive to the political economy of the world will need
to escape the grip of these divergent professional styles. International lawyers will
needtocross-train,learnabouteconomicsandrelearnpoliticsasaquotidianmatter
of hard decisions rather than an intermittent matter of diffuse conversation. The
governance challenge is not to bring political actors into law – they are already
there. Nor is it to establish – and then work to complete – functional equivalents
forfamiliarnationalgovernmentalinstitutions.Projectsoffunctionalequivalence–
aninternationalcriminallaw,aninternationaladministrativelaw,aninternational
constitutional law, an international judiciary – are notoriously limited in their
ability to grasp the global order whole, tending rather toward an inﬁnite ritual of
‘progressive development’, their completion an ever-receding horizon, their form
an abstraction far removed from the national legal and political realities they were
established to imitate. Conceived as general global competences, they act in the
world as narrow site-speciﬁc interventions. None are oriented to the challenge of
establishing a public hand capable of taking decisions about the distribution of
economic growth. Whether done locally, regionally, nationally, or transnationally,
this will require new ways of thinking, new modes of professional expertise, and
new uses forold institutions.
At the same time, international economic lawyers will need to relearn the
signiﬁcance of political choice and the dynamic social, political, and economic
impactofalternativeinstitutionalandregulatoryarrangements.Theeconomictar-
get is no longer the efﬁcient allocation of existing resources under constraint or
the maximization of comparative advantage. The economic challenge is to under-
stand and make the political, institutional, and social choices to place the global
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accommodatedivergentnationalconceptionsoftheregulatorybackgroundfor‘nor-
mal’marketactivityisnotenough.Atstakearelesstheglobalgainsfromtradethan
the distribution of those gains, the bargaining powers through which those distri-
butionsoccur,andthedynamicsocialandpoliticalconsequencesofthealternative
distributions which come with different economic trajectories. In the same spirit,
private international law will need to focus on the role of private-law forms and
relationshipsas actorsin thedistributionofeconomicandpoliticalpowers.
In short, to analyse and engage with the political economy of the world, inter-
national law will need to abandon many of its most signiﬁcant twentieth-century
programmaticpreoccupations,methodologicalaccomplishments,anddisciplinary
boundaries. To grasp international law’s political-economic signiﬁcance as a con-
stituter of centres and peripheries or a link and channel between them, the debris
of the traditional Westphalian narrative and its twentieth-century modernizations
will need to be hauled away. Over the last few decades, a variety of critical and
alternative strands of scholarship within the international legal ﬁeld have pushed
in these directions.
4.2. Whatheterogeneousandcriticaltraditionswithintheﬁeldhavealready
accomplishedtoturn thingsaround
The most important legacy of critical work in the ﬁeld over the last decades may
simplyhavebeentoidentifytheverylimitedimaginationoftheinternationallegal
establishment and to trace the routines by which it reproduces those limits in the
name of transcending them. That work may help open the door to a more broad-
rangingengagementwithlawasasiteforongoingpoliticalandeconomicstruggle.
To get there, international lawyers willneed toset aside the false promises the ﬁeld
makesaboutits ownsigniﬁcance and potentialfunctionininternationalsociety.
Many look to international law for the expression of universal values, most
commonly in the human rights canon. Critical traditions within the ﬁeld have
stressed the narrow speciﬁcity of international law’s purportedly universal vision
in a world where people disagree about the most fundamental things and where
values are not, in fact, universal. Projects to pursue particular ends in the name of
universal values run into characteristic difﬁculties and generate predictable blind
spots among those who pursue them. Human rights, a very speciﬁc late twentieth-
centuryendeavour,isnoexception.Humanrightscanasoftenbepartoftheproblem
as of the solution. The proliferation of ‘rights’ is not only a way to speak truth to
power. Power also routinely asserts itself as right – perhaps particularly as the
expression ofhumanrights.
International law also promises to identify the legitimate actors in the inter-
nationalsystemandtheirpowers–mostformallybyenumeratingthe‘rightsanddu-
tiesofstates’.Thisispartlysociological–simplyregisteringthepowerfulandtheirca-
pacities.Andofcourseitisalsonormative–offeringameasureofthelegitimateuses
and misuses of power which may be useful in resolving disputes about who can do
what.Infact,theﬁeldisneitherdescribingtheworldasitisnorhelpingustoimagine
and construct a world that could be. Indeed, the ﬁeld’s universalist descriptions of
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and commanding heights of global society. Nor is the discipline’s fantasy-land of
institutions and regimes – an international community of stakeholders, a global
society of rights-bearing individuals, a universal international criminal law, a
transparent international administrative law – a plausible programme of action.
These are the programmatic fashions of particular transnational elites, reassuring
distractions from understanding how the world is put together and how it might
be changed.
Perhapsmostimportantly,internationallawpromisesacatalogueofpolicytools
and institutional arrangements with which to confront global problems. Inter-
national lawyers have long said that like the European Union, only more so, the
internationalordergovernsinthekeyoflawratherthanthatofbudgetsoramono-
poly of force. It is no longer surprising to ﬁnd in one after another area that inter-
national law’s most coveted projects and proposals are wildly inadequate to the
tasks they purport to address. Their architects are embedded in the machinery of
globalpoliticalandeconomicpowerresponsibleforthedifﬁcultiesintheﬁrstplace.
That their best efforts in response would be limited by fealty to the limits imposed
by that machinery is to be expected. Nevertheless, for whatever reason, the Inter-
nationalCriminalCourtcouldtripleitsbudgetandjurisdiction,theUnitedNations
couldredoubleitspeacekeepingefforts,theinternationalhumanrightscommunity
couldperfectitsmachineryofreportingandshaming–anditwouldnotpreventthe
outbreak of genocide, the collapse or abuse of state authority. Every American and
Europeancorporationcouldadoptstandardsofcorporateresponsibility,everyFirst
World consumer could be on the lookout for products which are fairly traded and
sustainablyproduced,anditwouldnotstopthehumanandenvironmentalravages
of an unsustainable global economic order. America could sign the Kyoto Protocol,
couldagreewithChinaandIndiaandtheEuropeansonvariousmeasuresleftonthe
table at Copenhagen, and it would not be enough to prevent global warming. The
UnitedNations’MilleniumDevelopmentGoalscouldbeimplementedanditwould
not heal the rupture between leading and lagging sectors, cultures, classes. The Se-
curityCouncilcouldbereformedtoreﬂectthegreatpowersofthetwenty-ﬁrst,rather
thanthetwentieth,century,butitwouldbescarcelymoreeffectiveasaguarantorof
internationalpeaceandsecurity.Globaladministrativeactioncouldbeeverywhere
transparentand accountablewithoutrendering itpoliticallyresponsible.
Each of these efforts might be salutary. Some may be terribly important. At best,
however, the implementation of these schemes would kick things down the road,
manage expectations, render the problems to which they are purportedly being
addressed sustainable and thereby reafﬁrm the current distribution of powers and
thecentralityofthecentre.Asaresult,completingtheprogrammeofinternational
law would not renew the political economy of the world – any more than ﬁnally
‘completing’theEuropeanUnionwouldresolvethedynamicsofdualismwhichhave
rocked the project from Brussels and Frankfurt on down. The project of continuing
the project is part of how those dynamics are sustained. In Europe, a permanent
transitiontowardanever-recedinggoalofa‘political’unionsustainsthetechnocratic
separationofeconomicandpoliticalimperatives–andreinforcesthedividebetween
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legal order of equal sovereigns sustains one after another project of hegemony. As a
result,ratherthanatoolkitofpolicysolutionswhichmightbeadoptedintheglobal
publicinterest,itwouldbemoreaccuratetoseeinternationallawasacontinuation
of the politics of war and economic struggle, as a legitimating distraction from
the effort to remake those politics or reframe that struggle, and as an effort to
institutionalizethe ideologyofa particulartimeand placeas universal.
Onlyafterpushingpastinternationallaw’sclassicself-conception–asthehighest
expressionofuniversalvalues,thebestmapoftheworld’spoliticalactorsandtheir
powers, and toolkit of policy solutions – will international lawyers be able to use
internationallegalmaterialstoilluminatetheglobalpoliticalandeconomicprocess.
A crucial ﬁrst step is to change the profession’s default perception of the distance
between legal and political arrangements. Although international law has long
sought to throw a fragile net of rules across the roiling waves of global politics, its
relationshiptopowerisafarmoreintimateone.Criticaltraditionsfocusonlawasthe
languageinwhichgovernance–evenwar–iswrittenandperformed.Butthishasnot
civilizedglobalpoliticsintoalegal‘order’.Politicalstrugglecontinuesinandthrough
the regimes and vernaculars of international law. The global political/legal system
remains an extremely disorderly, plural, and uncertain one in which international
legality is less a matter of either normative validity or persuasion than it is a form
of effective assertion or performance of authority. When international lawyers say
that compliance with international law legitimates, whether on the battleﬁeld or
off,theymeanthatgrindingpoverty,terribleinequality,environmentaldestruction,
and the premeditated destruction and death of war have become acceptable. It
would be more accurate to count the vernaculars of legitimacy and the cramped
channelsofpublicorderentrenchedbyinternationallawamongtherootcausesfor
the difﬁcultiesfacingthe world.
Thiswayofthinkingopensthedoortorethinkinginternationallawasaterrainfor
politicalengagementratherthanasanormativeortechnicalsubstituteforpolitical
choice. In a similar way, it should be possible to shrink the experience of distance
betweeninternationallawandtheroutineoperationsoftheeconomy.International
law has long been rather unconcerned with economic affairs. Economics either
happenselsewhereonadifferentscale–withinthenation–oristhedomainofother
legaldisciplines,mostprominently‘internationaleconomiclaw’.Iseethisroutinely
amongstudentsaspiringtoworkintheﬁeldofhumanrights,ontheonehand,and
thoseaimingtocontributetothemanagementoftheglobaleconomyortonational
economic development, on the other. Too often, the ﬁrst group is uninterested in
economics, except to the extent social or economic development objectives might
bethehappyconsequenceofhumanrightsenforcement.Thelatterareunconcerned
about international public law other than the few institutions marked out as part
ofthe globaleconomic order,theWorldTradeOrganizationinparticular.
Criticalstrandswithintheﬁeldhaveaimedtounravelpublicinternationallaw’s
economicinnocence.Thestructuresofauthorityarticulatedinpublicinternational
law – ﬁrst among them territorial sovereignty – and the institutional separation of
publicandprivatepowersratiﬁedbytheﬁeldarecrucialinsettingthebackground
conditions for both national economies and global economic activity. At the samehttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
38 DAVID KENNEDY
time, the disciplinary claim by ‘international economic law’ to be the law behind
global economic activity is wildly inaccurate. International economic law is a far
narrower institutional and normative project focused on the relationship between
national regulatory structures affecting trade. The law behind global economic
activity is much broader – a vast and very uneven affair. Private law here, local
regulations there, informal industry standards in this sector, public administrative
regulationinthatsector,habitsofjurisdictionalassertionandforbearance,internal
corporate policies and the customary norms of illegal and shadow markets are all
partofthestory.
As the profession’s picture of the laws structuring global political and economic
life expands, it becomes ever more obvious that they are anything but distinct. Just
as it becomes clear that the law of the economy is a space of political choice and
struggle, or that the legalization of political life has structured the distribution of
economicopportunityandreward.Itisinthissensethatcriticalworkhasproposed
to think of private law and corporate governance as part of the constitutional in-
frastructure of global governance, and private obligations as background limits on
public power. Think of the network of obligations which tied our global ﬁnancial
system in knots – collateralized debt obligations, credit default swaps, and securit-
izationsocomplexandmarketssorapidnoregulatoryauthoritycanunravelthem.
Or corporate governance so ﬂuid and inscrutable one rarely knows who calls the
shots. All these stand in a long line of private arrangements – including slavery –
madein oneplacethat restrictpublicpolicyalternativeselsewhere.
Taken together, these critical efforts aim to reframe international law both to
expand the range of normative and institutional material to be considered when
contemplating the world’s legal regime and to break the habit of thinking of inter-
national law as distinct from politics and economics. In some sense, of course, this
is not new. The world’s political and economic elites have long learned to inhabit a
ﬂuid policy process in which they as often make as follow the law. If international
lawyers now draw the consequences of that knowledge as scholars, they will be
more likely to remember that things they do not like are also legal institutions and
structures of governance: poverty, war, inequality. Only by abandoning the com-
forting idea that ‘international environmental law’ concerns only environmental
protection and remembering that law also comforts those who would cut down
the forest can the profession come to explore the role of law in the reproduction of
povertyorthe continuityofwarinpeacetime.
These critical reinterpretations open the door to treating international law as a
political-economic space by displacing the ﬁeld’s self-conception and identifying a
wider range of materials which might serve as sinews of connection distributing
politicaloreconomicpoweramongcentresandperipheriesoftheworldsystem.To
the extent critical voices are prone to think the global political order is dominated
by statesmen and politicians from a hegemonic centre – or that the economy is
directed by ‘investors’ and ‘multinationals’ pulling the strings from some Davos-
inspired eyrie – an expanded conception of the legal terrain across which political
andeconomicforcescontendcanserveasausefulcorrective.Thepoliticaleconomy
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which authority, opportunity, and reward are distributed among people operating
in thatsystemis farmoredifﬁculttodecipher.
Thisisparticularlythecasetotheextentthesinewsbindingthepoliticaleconomic
system together are less norms enforced by institutions than ideas diffused across
theworldaboutwhoisentitledtowhat.Heterogeneousstrandsintheinternational-
law ﬁeld have also explored international law as a set of ideas, a mental map of the
world,asetofbeliefsaboutlegitimateandillegitimateaction,aformoftechnicalor
professional expertise. It is difﬁcult to understand how knowledge about the world
distributes power between centres and peripheries, how it encourages or enables
someactorstoextractpoliticalandeconomicrentsfromothers.Aﬁrststepissimply
to understand more fully how a ﬁeld of knowledge like international law operates
as apatternofauthority.
It is clear that the shared vernaculars of professional experts can inﬂuence what
individualandinstitutionalactorsbelievetheyoughtandoughtnottobedoing.After
all,ifforagenerationeveryonethinksaneconomyisanationalinput–outputsystem
to be managed, and then suddenly they all become convinced that an economy is a
global market for the allocation of resources to their most productive use through
theefﬁciencyofexchangeintheshadowofapricesystem,muchhaschanged.That
is also governance. Indeed, to the extent expertise has become the global currency
of rulership, understanding the political economy of the policy expertise system
has become a crucial part of understanding how we are governed. A better map of
theintellectualandinstitutionalsystemofrulership-by-expertisemayopenupnew
opportunitiesforinnovativepolicyand politicalcontestation.
For example, it is important to recognize that the profession’s insistence that
international law has domesticated the pre-Westphalian world of empire, religious
strife,andwarbyrenderingreligiousconfessionandideologicalconvictionmatters
of domestic concern and harnessing violence to the enforcement of right, while
comforting,isnotaccurate.Globalgovernanceremainsasmuchamatterofreligion,
ideology, and war as of persuasive interaction among the elites we call the ‘inter-
nationalcommunity’aboutwhatislegitimate.Infact,theinformalandclandestine,
the sacred, the violent, and the spectacular are part of how the world is governed.
The disciplinary urge to push them off-screen, either back in history or below
the waterline of sovereignty, nevertheless has a powerful impact. People who see
themselvesasreligiousactorsontheglobalstagehaveahardtimeseeingthemselves
reﬂectedinthevernacularsofauthoritythroughwhichthatstageisbuilt.Peoplewho
work in institutions which pride themselves on their centrality to global political
and economic order have a correspondingly hard time ﬁguring out how to think
about religion other than as a matter of personal belief or local culture. It would
not be surprising to ﬁnd that these ideas about religiosity helped distribute the
experienceofauthoritytoactinthepoliticaleconomyoftheworldinvariousways.
Itisdifﬁculttodevelopasatisfyingpictureofthewaysinwhichthefocalpoints,
blind spots, and biases of expertise help to construct relations between centres and
peripheries.Moreoften,scholarsfocusontheauthorityofagentstheycanseetoact
within structures they understand. Legal scholars have paid too little attention to
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of victimization, pride, and shame. All these things move like a virus or a fad,
but the discipline’s epidemiology is weak, the sociology of status, convention, and
emulation at the global level rudimentary. Indeed, to trace the contours of global
governanceistofollowthehandofknowledgeinarrangementsofpower.Doingso
would help to reframe international law less as a box of tools, a catalogue of actors,
a catalogueofuniversalvaluesthanas thearticulationofashared world.
There is a long way to go to understand how our world is made through articu-
lationandassertion,howthepracticeofassertionisstructuredbyinstitutionaland
professionaltechnologies,andhowthese,takentogether,distributeopportunityand
authority. Forty years ago it was common to say that the most signiﬁcant product
of the space race was a distant photo of planet Earth – and there was something
profound in the observation. Such things constitute a world long before scholars
begin to identify actors or structures, assert rulership, or solve problems. Of course,
such ideas arise from somewhere. Without a space programme, perhaps without a
Cold War, without Life magazine, we might not have had those photos at that mo-
mentinthatway,andtheideamighthavearisendifferently,atadifferentmoment,
or have seemed less compelling. The disciplinary practices of experts are part of
the technology through which the world to be governed – a world of centres and
peripheries– isassembled.
The role of knowledge in global power is particularly easy to see because global
governanceissooftenanassertion,anargument,aprogrammeofaction,oracallto
resistance.Indeed,whenitcomestoglobalgovernance,sayingitissocanmakeitso.
Or,perhapsbetter,sayingitissoisoftenallthereistoit.Thisisalwaystrueofpublic
authority – it comes into being and functions as an assertion. In other contexts we
havegotusedtothis.Peopleforget,otherthaninmomentsofrevolutionaryturmoil,
that the sovereign is just a person who says he is king. The institutionalization of
public power makes authority seem ‘real’, the distinction between ‘public’ and
‘private’ natural. In global governance, the saying and performing are right on the
surface. Global governance must be claimed, through an assertion that this or that
military deployment or human rights denunciation is the act of the global public
hand–the‘internationalcommunity’inaction.Therhetoricaldimensionofglobal
power is equally signiﬁcant for those who would resist. Saying it is not so is rarely
enough to unravel the world’s structure. Nevertheless, identifying the global hand
in local unpleasantness is also an assertion – and an allegation of responsibility.
Whether one aspires to bring global governance into being or fears its power, one
mustnameit,assertit,andidentifyit,beforeitbecomessomethingtobuildordestroy.
Indeed,inasense,‘globalgovernance’issimplythesumofwhatthosewhowishto
manage and toresist globallyhavejointlydrawnto ourattentionas governance.
One way in to this set of issues may be to explore further the way in which
international law is performed as an argument about international law itself – its
limits and its potential. Modest differences between policy proposals are routinely
debatedasiftheverypossibilityoflegalitywereatstake.Thistendencyiscommon
in discussions about global governance. The ‘international community’ discusses
intervention–whetherinLibyaorSyriaorSudan–inawaywhichfocusesasmuch
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course of action. At stake in debates about economic stimulus or austerity plans is
not only or even primarily who gets what, but rather the ‘credibility’ and ‘stability’
oftheregimeitself–theeuro,theEU,themarket.Andthiskindofassociationcanbe
self-fulﬁlling.Ifeveryonethinksthestabilityoftheeuroisatstake,then–well,the
stability of the euro is at stake. In this sense, the constitution of a world is ongoing,
a technical and institutional practice as well as a communicative and performative
workofthe imagination.
4.3. Implicatinginternationallawin therelationsbetween centres and
peripheries
Understanding the world-making effects of the knowledge practices of rulership
is an enormous programme for thought. International legal scholars could con-
tribute by situating international law in the larger global political and economic
system, interpreting its role as the glue linking leading and lagging ideas, regions,
or economic sectors, or as the cloak hiding asymmetric dynamics of power in the
politicaleconomyoftheworld.Conventionally,theﬁeldarticulatesauniversaland
homogeneous world from which it stands somewhat apart. There are inequalities,
of course, but the world it sees – and it would make – is a far more equal one. To
reframe the world that international law conjures into being as a system of centres
andperipherieswouldalreadybegin toarticulateaquite differentplace.
To reinterpret international law as the language constituting centres and per-
ipheries in the world’s political and economic system would certainly transform
the discipline’s self-image. As it sees itself, international law is the handmaiden,
thegentlecivilizer,thevoicecryingoutinthewilderness,articulatingvalidnorms,
namingandshamingfromthesidelines.Itskingdomliesinthefuture,presentnow
onlyasapromise.Internationallawyerscanﬁnditabsurdtobetreatedas‘thecentre’
of anything. Don’t we see how hard they are struggling just to stay in the game at
all?Whystigmatizethem,forcryingoutloud,whentherearesomanybiggerﬁshto
fry?
To critique the rulership of international law, you must establish it. Implicate
this ﬁeld in this order – constituting actors, channelling interactions, validating or
emboldening reciprocal claims. Nail down the role of international legal doctrine,
legalprofessionals,legalinstitutions,and structuresingovernance.Whonavigates
by their maps? For whom is international law the language of social or political
enforcement?Whatbureaucracieshavebeenspawnedintheirimage?Whoisthrust
aside,whocanonizedastheapexoftheinternationalcommunity?Therehasalways
beensomethingparadoxicalhere–thedisciplinealsoinsists(ifinadifferentvoice)
that its norms are effective, enforced, important. The odd thing is that establishing
the rulershipofinternationallawcan nevertheless be ascandal.
Thecriticalpointisthattheﬁeldgovernsdifferently–andfordifferentinterests–
thanitimagines.Internationallawfeelsthatitgovernsfromtheperiphery–thatstates
makethenormsandenforcethem.Thatpowerlieswithpolitics.Thoseworkingina
morecriticalveinhaveproposedsomethingdifferent–ﬁrst,thatinternationallawis
acentrewhichexercisespowerintheold-fashionedhierarchicalsense:humanrights
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the colonial encounter. Second, that international law has been the stage on which
projectsofcentralityandmarginalityhavebeenstaged.ArnulfBecker,forexample,
hastracedthistheatreintheeffortsofintellectualsfromthesemi-peripherytobuild
internationallawinthecentreastheysimultaneouslypursuedpoliticalprojectsof
the periphery in what they took to be the world’s cultural, political, and economic
order.7 International law frames a hub-and-spoke world between the developed
NorthAtlanticindustrialdemocraciesandeveryoneelsewhenitconsignsthesecond
to the law of ‘co-existence’ or the cold winds of free trade, while embracing the
former as an advanced space for regional integration and industrial policy, for the
lawof‘co-operation’andthedensefabricofcollaborationcharacteristicofrelations
among liberal democracies.8 In all these ways, international law offers a normative
vocabulary of entitlements that constitutes and structures relations among actors,
interests, and ideas in ways which leave some at the periphery and honours others
as central.It isthe glue.
Internationallawalsoconstructsaworldwhenitsvotariesimagineinternational
law as an artiﬁcial construct atop the real world of politics among nation-states; or
when they imagine that international law exiled religion to the pre-Westphalian
past, pushing confession below the waterline of sovereignty; or when they exile
womenintotheprivate,thelocal,thecultural;orplaceprivatecommercialactivity
outside the domain of international politics and governance. These ideas generate
narratives and institutions and expectations which shift the powers and status of
people inhabiting these identities to the periphery. And all the while international
law speaks the language of universals, embracing and arrogating to itself the uni-
versalethicsofhumanrights,thecriminalpowertotellrightfromwrong,thesavvy
political calculation by which necessity and proportionality are measured out in
war.In doingso, ithasalso becomethe cloak.
International legal scholars could do more to understand how this generates
asymmetries – between religious and secular, or between the reality of politics
and the artiﬁcialities of law. Does this have some bearing on the way relations
between ‘real’ states like Israel and artiﬁcial ‘entities’ like the Palestinian National
Authority become asymmetric? International law is part of the ﬁeld, the terrain,
the language, the structure, through which asymmetries between secular ethics
and religious confession, or the diplomatic world of international relations and
the economic world of private markets, arise and are reinforced. It provides the
normativefabric,themarkerofstatus,thepurveyorofentitlementthroughwhichthe
routine operations of people pursuing politics and economics, ethics and religion,
generateasymmetryandhierarchy.Thepointislessthatinternationallawexercises
power as the centre than that it makes itself available as a lexicon of entitlement in
a ﬁeldcharacterizedbydynamicasymmetry.
7 SeeArnulfBeckerLorca,MestizoInternationalLaw:AGlobalIntellectualHistory,1850–1950(forthcoming2013,
CambridgeUniversity Press).
8 See, for example, W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (1964); A. Slaughter, ‘A Liberal
TheoryofInternationalLaw’,Proceedingsofthe94thAnnualMeetingoftheAmericanSocietyofInternationalLaw
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The potential of centre–periphery analytics for international legal analysis will
onlyberealizedifcriticalscholarscanrelaxtheiron-cagetop-downpre-Foucauldian
modelofpowersocommonlyassociatedwithcentre–peripherydynamicsandlearn
from international law’s own insistence that the world’s legal and political order
is far more mixed up and ﬂuid than that. Twentieth-century international law was
onto something – or created something – when it reﬁgured world order as an open
and shifting process whose ‘governance’ was more a functional reinterpretation
of things dispersed across the institutional and political life of the planet than
the work of agents empowered by structures. In its own imaginary – and in life –
international law no longer sits ‘on top’, governing the relations between states. It
prides itself on having become diffused through the global political process as a
vernacular of legitimacy, as a horizontal theatre of argument, performance, claims,
andassertions.Anti-formalism,anti-foundationalism,andembraceofthedispersed
theatrics of global power have all been hard-won in the international legal ﬁeld.
To focus on international law’s role in the reproduction of hierarchies of centre
and periphery in the world, international lawyers need not turn back from these
discoveries.Itonlyremainstodevelopacentre–peripheryanalyticseverybitasanti-
formal,anti-foundationalandattunedtothedispersedpowersofsocialperformance
and expectation.
How,forexample,doesthecommercialarbitrationregimereinforcethecentrality
oftheNorth,theprivate,theeconomicvis- ` a-visaperipheryoftheSouth,thepublic,
the political? It is hard to say. The regime looks evenly balanced. States – like
companies – sign up. The regime itself could hardly be more dispersed or ad hoc.
Thedevelopedworldislearningthatitsownregulatoryregimesmayyetcometobe
as vulnerable to attack by trading partners as those of the emerging markets whose
policy space was meant to be constrained by the discipline of bilateral investment
treaties. And yet, somehow commercial arbitration has metastasized to become
an adjudicator of last resort for reviewing the legislative, administrative, and even
judicial decisions of the developing world. Just how do commercial and ﬁnancial
imbalancestranslateintopoliticalrestraint?CouldweactuallyimagineThirdWorld
investors using arbitration to contest – and successfully stay – the implementation
of a US Supreme Court decision as recently happened to Ecuador in the ongoing
Chevron case? If not, what are the legal, professional, ideological, commercial, or
politicalsinewsthatreproducethisimbalance?Ascommercialarbitration,inGarth
andDezalay’scompellingphrase,goesabout‘dealinginvirtue’,howarehierarchies
leftin itswake?9 The answerwillbe ﬁne-grain, eveniftheoutcomes arestark.
Centre–periphery analytics might also help us understand the internal economy
of a profession for which rulership is both scandal and dream. There is asymmetry
and dualism within the self on the terrain where the ﬁeld’s will to power and to
marginality are managed, a centre and a periphery in phases of the international
legal professional’s sensibility and self-image. This internal ambivalence drives
9 B. Garth and Y. Dezalay, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a Trans-
nationalLegalOrder(1996);seealsoA.Shalakany,‘ArbitrationandtheThirdWorld:BiasundertheScepterof
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international lawyers working in the humanitarian ﬁeld, for example, to oscillate
between situational pragmatism and a more ethically self-conﬁdent universalism.
Perhapstheyarepragmaticintheﬁeldandethicallyself-conﬁdentinheadquarters,
savvy over lunch and sanctimonious in their pitch to donors. Both are part of their
professional style. Relations between them are ﬂuid and differ over time and in
different institutional settings. It is difﬁcult to understand how these postures ﬁt
togetherinaprofessionalstyle.Often,however,thereisasymmetry,pragmatismthe
centralprofessionalsensibilityattheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross,eth-
icalself-conﬁdenceatthecentreforhumanrightsorganizationsaddressingthesame
battleﬁeldactivity.Relationsbetweentheseinstitutions,betweenthedoctrinesand
prioritiesembeddedineach,inpartmaybeafunctionofthedynamicbetweenthese
different professional sensibilities. A further avenue for research: in the shadow of
whatpsycho-socialorprofessionalrulesdothesesensibilitiesrelatetooneanother?
Dothese asymmetriesarise?
In all such matters of interpretation, perspective matters. Talking about centres
andperipheriessoundsdifferentattheperiphery.Storiesaboutdifferenceanddom-
inationwhichmakepowerfulpoliticsinthecentrecanalsooffend–identifyingthe
excluded subjects, the unrepresented stakeholders, pinning victims to their subju-
gation. How does it sound at the periphery to hear it said that sovereignty is just a
‘bundle of rights’, or, in the words of the 1949 ICJ, ‘an institution, an international
social function of a psychological character’.10 Thanks, but we just got here – we’ll
stick with sovereignty as exclusive political power within a territory. When the
EU tells ‘new members’ how privileged they are to have joined a club of equals, it
speaks to their hopes, their dignity. Why should they want to hear that they are
still ‘the periphery’? A lot depends on how angry the audience is to begin with.
Those of us who talked about centre–periphery relations in the Eurozone seemed
likespoilsportsas the1992 ‘internal market’programmetookoff.Less sonow.
Iroutinelyaskmystudentshowtheyseetheirgeneration’sproject.Is2012,Iask,
like 1648 or 1919, when it seemed everything needed to be rethought? Or is it like
1945, when the international order seemed to need reforming – but not remaking.
Tweak the League Covenant and you have the UN. Replace European empire with
self-determination under American hegemony and continue. Or is this like 1989,
whenthedemandwasnotreformbutimplementation–withCommunismdefeated
the solutionsputforwardageneration beforecouldﬁnallybe implemented.
Unsurprisingly,manygoforthemiddleposition.Reform,addBraziltotheSecurity
Council,sortoutthedemocracydeﬁcitandcurrencytravailsinEuropewithanother
round of treaty drafting. But an ever-increasing number say 2012 is their 1648. As
wetalkitthrough,itoftenseemsthedivisionreﬂects,aswesay,‘wherethestudents
are coming from’. Not necessarily their nationality – but their sensibility. In this
sense,thepoliticalappetiteforcriticismhasacentre–peripherydynamicofitsown.
Those who hope to inherit the commanding heights split between 1945 and 1989.
Those who feel their interests, politics, national projects, have been stymied by
10 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment of 9 April 1949, [1949] ICJ Rep. 4, at 39 (Judge
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forces beyond their control opt for 1648. The conviction that the preoccupations of
the international legal ﬁeld pale before the injustice of the world is not a recipe for
reformorrenewal.Itisarecipefordisenchantment,forawithdrawalofconﬁdence,
afﬁliation,interest, fromthemachinery weknow as‘governance’.
Indeed,theplausibilityofcentre–peripherystoriesdependsonwhereyoustand.
At the centre, the system seems far too squishy for there to be a centre–periphery
dynamic. At the periphery, the dynamic seems far too obvious for the centre to be
squishy. Discussion between these positions is unlikely to be productive – indeed,
the difference between them is likely to be exacerbated by dialogue, for each is
denyingwhattheotherﬁndsmosttrue.Moreover,insomesensebothsideserr.Just
becausetheorderisplastic,thecentresquishy,doesnotmeanthereisnocentreand
no periphery. But just because there is does not mean there’s an iron cage – or an
iron will. It can be unfair and hierarchical and still not be a conspiracy, diabolically
difﬁculttochange and still notbe necessity.
Forthelastfewyears,IhavebeenparticipatingindiscussionsatDavosonglobal
policy, risks, and governance. Just after the crisis, much seemed up for grabs – the
WorldEconomicForumlauncheda‘GlobalRedesignInitiative’tosupportwhatthey
called a ‘fundamental reboot’ of the ‘global architecture’. They were clear, however,
thatthiswasnot1945–letalone1648.Nolargeinstitutionalreorganizationseemed
possible – or wise. What was necessary was a new spirit at all levels, and a new
willingnesstousethetoolsathandtorespondtourgentissuesinnewconﬁgurations.
Fromthis‘centre’,globalgovernancewassomethingalreadyconstitutedglobalelites
could and should undertake – if only they had the will. Will was hard to generate,
however,withgovernancesofragmented,sodisparate,sopowerlessinanyparticular
site.
It looks more like 1648 if you feel the world is already governed but you are not
partofit.Ifyoucanfeelthattheglobaleconomicforcesthatshaketheeconomy,the
society,oryourownfamilyarefacilitatedbysomeinstitutionalorlegalarrangements.
Fromthisperspective,economicinstabilityorpovertyarenotproblemswhichescape
governance. They are the by-products – or even the intended consequences – of the
current governance arrangements. It is easy to conclude the people at Davos must
want ittoturnoutthis wayand havegotwhattheywant.
Thereislittledirectdialoguebetweenthesepositions.AtDavosthereweredemon-
strators and lots of barbed wire – one friend came back through security to the
conference hall proud to have collected a couple of rubber bullets. But these per-
spectives do interact. In recent years, a new vernacular has arisen in governance
circles to discuss the interaction between these perspectives. To this way of think-
ing,therelationshipbetweenacentrethatrealizesitistoosquishytodomorethan
play for time and a periphery outside demanding more should be understood as
a matter of social-political risk management and ‘sustainability’, a term detached
from its origins in environmental science. The basic question for rulers: how much
timedowehave?Howlong canwekickthecandowntheroad,tryingtogetthings
right, before the problem swamps us through the machinery of political or social
unrest? Global ﬁscal imbalances are ‘unsustainable’, in this sense, for example, if
they will lead to political rupture before we can turn them around. Although mosthttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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social institutions are all too sustainable – poverty, inequality, ill health – relations
between the centre and the periphery often do seem to implicate the system’s own
sustainability.
Thisnew‘sustainability’analysisisagovernancevernacularformanagingcentre–
periphery dynamics. It is not demonstrations facing off against bullets, rubber or
otherwise.Everyoneisalsocalculating,interpreting,imaginingtheirsituationrela-
tive to the other and communicating. It is not clear, ultimately, who is ‘the centre’.
Those on the street can also play the sustainability game – perhaps they will hold
on long enough for something to crack. For the rulers, knowing how little can be
controlled,itiseasytooverestimatethepotentialforeverythingtoslipoutofhand.
Moreover,theextenttowhichtheperipheryiswillingtoacceptmarginalizationor
exclusionisitselfamovingtarget,shifting,inpart,asbeliefintheplausibilityofthe
narrativesof thecentre waxes and wanes.
ThiskindofsymbolicsystemseemsripeforanalysisinMyrdalianterms.Thereis
a loose dualism – those outside, those inside; those near and far from some ‘centre’.
Their relative positions are themselves part of what is at stake in their interactions,
eachbyturnclaimingthemodestyoftheperipheryandauthorityofthecentre.The
interaction isstructured.The positionsareconstituted by ‘entitlements’which rest
inlawandsocialexpectation.Thereareavenuesofreciprocalinﬂuence,tendencies
to spiral,whether viciouslyor virtuously.
Ihavelookedatanumberofinternationaldoctrinalworldsovertheyears–most
recentlythecomplexduetbetweenhumanitariansandmilitarystrategistsoverthe
legitimacy of war. They all have something of this structure. A loose vernacular
between an ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ that seems amenable to interpretation in dualist
terms, avenues of interaction, patterns of persuasion, all nested in a set of what we
mightthinkofasentitlements.Thedifﬁcultyistoﬁgureouthowitwillworkwhen
you turn it on. Will human rights and humanitarian law civilize the military or be
co-opted by them? Can anything be said about how the relative persuasiveness of
theirpositions willdevelopovertime?Increasingly, Ibelievethe answer isyes.
5. INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD
POLITICAL ECONOMY
Such an analysis may not be politically satisfying. If you are occupying Wall Street
or, for that matter, Tahrir Square, the centre–periphery dynamics in international
law may seem an astonishingly elite preoccupation. What about real politics!A sa n
Egyptian friend of mine put it: ‘Excuse me, but we have a revolution going on.’
And revolutions call out for bolder centre–periphery narratives, clearly identifying
whom to favour and whom to oppose. The difﬁculty is that even revolutionaries
sometimeslackastrongtheory–orevenagoodsociologicalpicture–ofhowthings
hold together. It can be tempting to turn back from a twentieth-century embrace
of power as performance and argument and identity to the ﬁrmer stuff of interests,
structures, classes. Real centres and real peripheries. The critical project I propose
leans against this kind of political demand. Centre–periphery relations are far less
mechanicalthanthatandbetterthoughtofasmattersofinterpretationandassertion,http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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tools for the development of dynamic accounts of mid-level relationships among
positions,sectors,regions,orideas,frameworksforuncoveringthedistributivework
oflegal arrangementsand expert knowledgepractices.
At the same time, for international lawyers to take on the challenge of under-
standing and transforming the political economy of the world, they will need to
turnagainstprofessionaldemandsforanaccountofwhatinternationallawpermits
and forbids or how the world is legally constituted. The world simply is not consti-
tuted in the sense that things ﬁt together in ways articulated in foundational legal
documents. Stories about the UN charter, the WTO, the human rights corpus as
world‘constitutions’arefairytalesandinternationallawisfartooﬂuidtoserveasa
judgeofthepermittedandprohibited.Internationallawisbetterunderstoodaspart
of the glue that holds people, positions, and places in dynamic relations with one
another, the sinews that link centres and peripheries, and the cloak that obscures
the dynamicoperationsofhierarchy.
Thinkingabout‘politicaleconomy’hasbecomedifﬁcultbecausepoliticsandeco-
nomics have been structured to operate on different scales, with different players,
served by different professions and interpreted by different academic and expert
disciplines. Politics and economics will not be brought together like great powers
negotiating a new treaty. Nor will they be brought together by academic theories
of their inseparability. They will be reunited by reconﬁguring the doctrines, insti-
tutions, professional practice, and simple common sense through which they have
becomeseparate.Thisisthepointofintellectualandprofessionalcross-training:to
disestablish the parallel cadres that service the public and the private, the political
and the economic. This is the goal of unravelling the distinctions whose expert
interpretation and management conﬁrms the separation – between public law and
privatelaw,betweenmarket-supportingandmarket-distortingpublicpolicy,andso
forth.
For the professional politicalclass to remake the world’s politicaleconomy, they
will need to ﬁnd new institutional channels to integrate transnational interests
and new levers to contest faraway decisions which affect their interests. The global
political-economic regime will need to make policy space for alternative national
and local experiments and strategies designed to manage the internal distribution
ofgrowthbetweenleadingandlaggingsectorsorregionsandimprovethenational
capacity to capture gains from trade and structure its own insertion into the global
economy. Effective governance is no longer a matter of eliminating the corruption
or capture of public authorities – difﬁcult as that is. Nor is it a matter of sound
corporate governance, corporate social responsibility and effective regulatory su-
pervision – difﬁcult as those are. Effective governance requires that the public and
private actors become adept at something none are now well organized – or well
disposed – to attempt: managing the distribution of growth, linking leading and
lagging,managingthepoliticaleconomyofdualism.Andtheymustdothisnotonly
in their backyard, in their territory, in their sector, but in a new world of shifting
relationsandlinkages.Wheresmallthingshavelargeeffects,wherelocalrulesgov-
ern global transactions, and where very little is transparent or predictable. Only by
considering economic and political objectives at the same time and on a parallelhttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Mar 2013 IP address: 140.247.201.57
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scale will it be possible to respond to the global challenge of linking experimental,
leading-edge economic dynamism wherever it occurs with everyone else. Across
cities, withinand between nations,in regions, acrossthe world.
International lawyers have much to contribute to such a project, particularly if
they grasp the depth of injustice in the world today, the urgency of change and the
signiﬁcanceoftheirprofessionalroutinesinthereproductionofpoliticalincapacity.
Legal scholars have generated new economic and political ideas before – not all of
themsensible.Theycoulddosoagain.Indeed,thepresenceoflawinthefoundations
and ongoing practices of both economics and politics makes it surprising that they
donot. Nevertheless, agreatdealofintellectualworkremainsto bedone.
If we undertake such a critical project, we will want to recall how long it took to
disentangle politics and economics. To invent a national politics and organize the
worldinnation-states–andthentobuildaglobaleconomy.Foralltheagonythathas
comewithsuccess,buildinganationalpublicpoliticsacrosstheplanethadastrong
emancipatory dimension – slaves, women, workers, peasants, colonial dominions
obtainedcitizenshipinrelationshiptothenewinstitutionalmachineryofanational
politics.Itwillnotyieldeasily.Itwasequallydifﬁculttobuildaglobaleconomyatop
that political order. For all the vulnerability, instability, and inequality wrought by
the effort, the global economy has also lifted hundreds of millions from poverty. It
will not be unbuilt in a day. Building a new political economy for a global society
will be equally difﬁcult. The promise is equally large. The spirit of new approaches
is tobegin.